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Race and Educational Achievement
Jonathan Crane
The barrage of publicity surrounding the recent publica-
tion of The Bell Curve, by Richard J. Herrnstein and
Charles Murray, has catapulted the issue of race differ-
ences in test scores onto the center stage of public discus-
sion. It has ignited a firestorm of debate about whether
such differences are a product of genes or the environ-
ment. While Herrnstein and Murray decline to draw a
definitive conclusion, their presentation and interpretation
of evidence on the topic unmistakably supports the con-
tention that whites are genetically superior to blacks in
intelligence. They systematically highlight die strengths
of arguments for genetic differences, while emphasizing
the weaknesses of points against them.
But, in fact, die case for genetic differences suffers from
a number of fundamental flaws. Recent research
strengthens the case for an exclusively environmental
explanation of the race gap. This article summarizes the
flaws in the case for genetic differences, describes some
of the new findings, and discusses die policy implications
of these results.
Fundamental Flaws in the Case for Genetic Differences
Between Races
Many studies in behavior genetics have compared die test
scores of people with different degrees of genetic similar-
ity (identical twins, other siblings, parents and dieir chil-
dren, etc.), some of whom shared common environments
and some of whom did not. These studies have found
that heredity plays a large role in die determination of test
scores. According to those who believe diat race differ-
ences are genetic, diese findings imply diat environment
plays too small a role to possibly account for the gap
between races.
This argument suffers from four major flaws. First,
estimates of the size of the role that genes play in deter-
mining test scores vary widely, and newer studies suggest
Uiat this role is smaller than was originally believed.
When die modern argument for genetic differences be-
tween races was first framed in the sixties, it was predi-
cated on estimates that genes explain 70%-80% of the
variation in test scores. Most recent estimates are con-
siderably lower, in the range of 40%-60%.
Second, even die highest estimates do not preclude the
possibility diat environment explains the entire race gap.
Genetic and environmental causes overlap and interact.
For example, intelligent children enrich their own envi-
ronments by seeking out opportunities to learn. There-
fore estimates of die amount of variation explained by
heredity and environment can sum to more than 100%.
So even if genes did explain 80% of the variation in test
scores, environment could also explain 80%.
Third, estimates of die size of the genetic effect have
been generated from comparisons among people of the
same race. They say nothing about the causes of racial
differences. Even if test score variation within each race
were completely determined by genes, differences be-
tween races could be completely a product of environ-
mental causes.
Fourth, there have been numerous cases in which envi-
ronment has generated changes in test scores as large, or
even substantially larger, than the existing race gap.
James R. Flynn, a noted psychologist, has found that
average IQ scores have increased by large amounts in
just one or two generations in 14 developed countries,
including the U. S. Most of these increases amounted to
10-20 points, about the same size as the 15 point race gap
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in America. The increase in France was 25 points. All
of the gains occurred in far too short a time to be ex-
plained by genetic changes in the populations. It is im-
possible to argue that environment cannot produce test
score differences as large as the current race gap, when it
has done just that in country after country.
New Evidence that Environment Explains
the Entire Race Gap
The international data do not address the issue of die race
gap directly. But analysis of new data suggests that envi-
ronment does account for the entire race difference in
math and reading test scores.
These data are drawn from the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY), one of a few large, long-term
surveys of the American population commonly used by
social scientists. The NLSY is uniquely valuable, be-
cause it collects very detailed information about die home
environments of children and the childbearing practices of
their parents (in addition to more standard information,
such as family income). For example, it asks mothers
how often they read to their children, what forms of
discipline they use, and how much time they spend with
them in various activities. It also administers a number
of cognitive tests to both the mothers and die children.
Using diis information, I find that if various aspects of
home environment and socioeconomic status are held
constant by statistical means, black children score as high
on math and reading tests as do whites. In other words,
black and white children who grow up in comparable
environments score almost exactly die same, on average.
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The only reason the overall black averages are lower is
that black children tend to grow up in environments that
are less conducive to scholastic achievement.
The techniques used in this analysis enable us to estimate
how much of the race gap in test scores is attributable to
differences in each of several specific aspects of home
environment and socioeconomic status. Table 1 shows
the percentage of the gap in math scores that is accounted
for by each component of the child's environment. Table
2 does die same for reading comprehension scores.
For example, Table 1 shows that differences in early
intellectual stimulation explain 17.3% of the math gap.
Overall, differences in home environment and
childrearing practices account for 62.3% of the gap.
Intellectual stimulation and emotional support both ex-
plain substantial amounts. Early home environment
accounts for more of the gap than later environment does,
although both are important. Race differences in rates of
breast-feeding explain 6.7% of the gap. (Recent medical
studies suggest that breastmilk itself contributes to cogni-
tive development, in addition to any effects of breast-
feeding on the bond between mother and child.) Differ-
ences in socioeconomic factors such as family income,
household size, and quality of die mother's education
explain 36.6% of die gap. The remaining unexplained
gap of 1.1% is not statistically significant.
Table 2 presents similar findings for the race gap in
reading comprehension scores. Home environment and
childrearing practices account for 69.5% of the differ-
ence. Family income and household size explain 22.5%
and 8.0%, respectively. Together, diese factors account
for 100% of the gap.
Herrnstein and Murray criticize past applications of this
statistical approach. They note, correctly, that it ignores
die possibility diat die environmental differences which
appear to account for the race gap could themselves be
generated by genetic differences in die intelligence of
parents. To account for this possibility, I subtracted out
the portion of the child's environment diat is related to
maternal test scores. The remaining portion of the envi-
ronment is thus free of genetic influences, at least from
die modier. It still explains die entire race differences in
die children'.s test scores.
Of course these findings for math and reading don't
necessarily apply to odier kinds of tests. But another
recent study by Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, Pamela Klebanov
and Greg Duncan points to die same result for IQ. In
any case, if we could equalize math and reading skills
dirough environmental interventions, it is unlikely diat
Table 1. Shares of the Race Gap in Math Scores Explained by Differences in Particular Aspects
of the Environment
% of Gap Explained By
Early Intellectual Stimulation 17.3%
Early Emotional Support 16.9
Later Intellectual Stimulation 8.7
Later Emotional Support 10.2
Extreme intellectual Deprivation 2.5
Breastfeeding 6.7
Family Income 15.7
Household Size 10.8
Quality of the Mother's Education 10.
1
Total 98.9
Left Unexplained 1.1
100.0%
Table 2. Shares of the Race Gap in Reading Comprehension Scores Explained by Differences
in Particular Aspects of die Environment
% of Gap Explained By
Early Intellectual Stimulation 20.2%
Early Emotional Support 14.2
Later Intellectual Stimulation 13.0
Later Emotional Support 15.6
Breastfeeding 6.5
Family Income 22.5
Household Size 8.0
Total 100.0%
even if gaps on other tests remained they would have
important social consequences.
In sum, there is substantially less scientific evidence in
support of genetic differences in test scores between races
than Herrastein and Murray contend. Although we have
not yet proven that race differences in scores are com-
pletely environmental, the weight of the evidence suggests
just that.
Policy Implications
These findings suggest that if we were able to enrich the
home environments of black children, we could close
most of the race gap in cognitive test scores. So far,
programs designed to change home environments have
not had large impacts on children's test scores. It turns
out that generating permanent changes in childrearing
practices and other aspects of home environment is ex-
tremely difficult, for a variety of reasons. Nevertheless,
further research and experimentation in this area seems
warranted, since the finding here suggest that if success-
ful programs could be developed, the benefits would be
quite large.
Research suggests that people's childrearing practices are
heavily influenced by parents, peers, and neighbors.
New strategies using support groups to reinforce behavior
changes, or even convey information in the first place,
may prove more successful. The findings here also sug-
gest that programs designed to encourage breast-feeding
could have a positive impact. For reasons unknown,
white women are three times more likely to breast-feed
than black women are. While breast-feeding isn't neces-
sarily the best choice for everyone, the large difference in
feeding behavior does seem to contribute to the test score
gap.
While programs designed to enrich home environments
have not had large effects on test scores, a number of
programs designed to enrich school environments have.
This fact is not widely known, perhaps because most of
the attention has focused on Head Start, which has been
shown to raise children's test scores by small amounts.
However, more intensive pre-school programs can raise
scores dramatically. While some of these gains wear
away after several years, follow-up programs in elementa-
ry schools can prevent this erosion. The most successful
elementary school interventions have used one-on-one
tutoring to supplement the child's classroom experience.
Recent polls and political trends suggest a widespread
impression among the general public that most blacks and
other minorities are doomed to educational failure, and
that we simply have no way of remedying this problem.
The Bell Curve not only reinforces this opinion, it sug-
gests that solutions are impossible. The findings dis-
cussed here clearly contradict that premise, as does the
success of educational interventions. But the strongest
piece of evidence that it is possible to close the race gap
in cognitive test scores comes from the historical record.
Contrary to popular belief, blacks have, slowly but sure-
ly, been closing the achievement gap over the last twenty-
five years. Between 1969 and 1990, the race gap in the
math scores of seventeen year olds fell by 48%. The gap
in reading scores fell by 42%. In short, almost half the
work has already been done. The results described here
suggest that the job can be finished.
Jonathan Crane is an assistant professor at the Institute of
Government and Public Affairs and the Department of
Sociology at the University of Illinois in Chicago.
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The Committee for Educational Rights
v. Edgar: Law or Politics in School
Finance Reform?
James G. Ward, W. Bradley Colwell, and
James L. Kestner
On September 29, 1994 die First District Appellate Court
of Illinois decided die most recent school finance reform
case in die state. The Committee for Educational Rights
v. Edgar. This decision dealt another blow to diose who
have worked to reform die state's school finance system
to provide greater equity in funding among public school
districts. Unless die Illinois Supreme Court overturns it,
which most legal observers view as unlikely, diis decision
will mark die end of four years of litigation.
The 37 school districts diat filed the original lawsuit in
November 1990 comprise The Committee for Educational
Rights Under die Constitution ("the Committee"). They
are part of a larger reform group called the Coalition for
Educational Rights Under die Constitution ("die Coali-
tion"). The Coalition was created out of the frustration
felt by many educational leaders and odiers about die in-
ability or unwillingness of die Illinois General Assembly
to achieve school finance reform after 1985.
In 1985 die Illinois General Assembly passed an omnibus
education reform package, which included the repeal of
Section 18-8 of die School Code of Illinois, effective
August 1, 1987. This section contains die general state
aid distribution formula for Illinois public schools. The
General Assembly's motivation in implementing the de-
layed effective date was to allow die legislature and die
governor ample time to achieve consensus on reform of
the general state aid formula. Between 1985 and 1987 a
great deal of activity surrounded school finance reform,
but no consensus on reform was reached. Consequently,
in its regular 1987 session die General Assembly passed
legislation which reversed die repeal of Section 18-8 on
August I, 1987.
In November 1990 tlurty-seven school districts and
a number of parents and students filed the lawsuit
in the Chancery Division of the Circuit Court of
Cook County, Illinois, asking the court to declare
the School Code provision relating to financing
public schools in violation of the Illinois Constitu-
tion of 1970. The trial court dismissed the suit for
failure to state a cause of action upon which relief
may be granted under Illinois civil procedure. The
Coalition appealed that decision, and on September
29, 1994, the Appellate Court, First District,
affirmed the trial court's decision.
After die General Assembly's failure to enact school
finance reform legislation, the Coalition was formed to
pursue any one of diree possible avenues for reform: (1)
continued legislative action, (2) a constitutional amend-
ment, and (3) a constitutional challenge to die state sys-
tem. Since 1987 die Illinois General Assembly has made
minor changes in die general state aid formula, but no
equity reform has taken place. In the 1992 session bodi
chambers of die General Assembly approved a proposed
amendment to die Illinois Constitution which would have
replaced parts of Article X widi much stronger support
for school finance equity in Illinois. In the November
1992 election the proposed amendment was favored by
57.1 percent of die voters, barely failing to secure die 60
percent voter approval it needed to become part of the
constitution. Two of die three strategies chosen by the
Coalition had not been successful.
The University of Illinois is an affirmative action/equal opportunity institution.
The final avenue was a constitutional challenge to the
state funding system. Since not all members of the Coali-
tion supported a lawsuit, a smaller committee was formed
to pursue that action. Many members of the Coalition
were sympathetic with the goals of a lawsuit, but believed
that the Illinois Constitution and its subsequent interpreta-
tion by the courts would not successfully sustain the chal-
lenge.
The Complaint
In the complaint, the Committee challenged as unconstitu-
tional the Illinois school finance system on the grounds
that differences in taxable property wealth among school
districts and the effects of diese differences on die ability
of school districts to provide student benefits and educa-
tional opportunities equal to those provided in wealthier
districts are not permissible. Specifically, the Committee
charged Uiat die state's statutory scheme of financing
public schools,
1. Violates the Illinois Constitution's education arti-
cle (Art. X, § 1);
2. Violates die Illinois Constitution's equal protec-
tion clause (Art. I, § 2); and
3. Violates provisions diat apply to economically
disadvantaged students.
In the original complaint, die Committee presented volu-
minous factual data that purported to support dieir case
that vast inequities do exist among Illinois school districts
and that these inequities are the basis of a constitutional
violation.
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The Appellate Decision
In dismissing the constitutional challenge to the Illinois
system of financing public schools, the court acknowl-
edged that this system, which permits discretionary local
spending that cannot be overcome by the state's equaliza-
tion scheme, results in unequal spending. But the court
admonished that the solution to this situation "must come
from die lawmakers and from the democratic pressures of
diose who elect them." This ruling is consistent with
federal constitutional pronouncements on this issue (San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973))
and prior Illinois decisions going back at least to People
v. Deatheridge in 1948. The court declared that any
reform in the state's system of financing public schools
must come through the political process and that the
legislative process is die proper forum for redress.
An Analysis of the Decision
The court dismissed die education article complaint
(Count I) with its ruling that the Committee had failed to
establish a cause of action against the state. The Commit-
tee alleged diat die Illinois school finance system violates
diat portion of die education article requiring the state to
establish "an efficient system of high quality public edu-
cational institutions and services." The court argued that
"efficient" does not mean "fiscally neutral," nor does it
guarantee "equal educational benefits and opportunities."
The court said diat elimination of disparities is a goal
under die Illinois Constitution, but is not required. In
sum, the court believed diat while disparities exist and
should be eliminated, the current system of school finance
is constitutionally permissible because it is sufficient to
support an adequate education for all children in the state.
In Count II the Committee argued that equal protection
had been denied because school spending disparities
denied certain students a fundamental right to education.
In response, die court challenged the Committee's asser-
tion diat die amount of money spent on a child's educa-
tion equals a better education, stating that no empirical
evidence was presented to diat effect. The court also
stated diat education is not a fundamental right under the
Illinois Constitution. The court then employed the ratio-
nal basis test and found that the Committee had not "sus-
tained die burden" of showing diat any student has been
denied equal protection by being deprived of an adequate
education; it also found diat die Illinois school finance
system is rationally related to the goal of local control.
Count III claimed diat die Illinois Constitution has been
violated because die current system of financing public
schools does not provide sufficient resources to meet the
needs of economically disadvantaged children who are at
risk of academic failure. The Committee argued that this
violates the education clause because children at risk of
academic failure are not provided a high quality, or even
"the lesser included standard of minimally adequate edu-
cation." The court noted that there is no statutory re-
quirement for die "lesser included standard" and, diere-
fore, the Committee had failed to state a cause of action.
The court also said that the Committee's allegation diat
the current system of serving children at risk of academic
failure is not a violation of die equal protection clause
because the statutory system is rationally related to the
goal of local control.
In a final point, die court noted diat the Committee's
"citation to additional authority after oral argument,"
namely the New Jersey Supreme Court's finding in
Abbott v. Burke (1994), that its state school finance
system is unconstitutional, could not be reconciled with
the facts of the Illinois situation.
The Illinois Appellate Court rejected each of die Com-
mittee's grounds for review and upheld the trial court's
decision to dismiss die case. The court's final words
were an admonition, taken from San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, that "die consideration and
initiation of fundamental reforms widi respect to state
taxation and education are matters reserved to die legisla-
tive processes of die various States, and we do no vio-
lence to the values of federalism and separation of powers
by staying our hand." The court, continuing to quote die
San Antonio decision, further noted diat diis was not an
affirmation of the status quo, but a rejection of judicial
review as the proper avenue of redress.
ars, such as Cass Sunstein and Robert Burt, have written
on the development of judicial review and raise questions
about excessive reliance on judicial review in a democra-
cy. They regard judicial review as a further weakening
of the responsibility of elected officials and ordinary
citizens and a distraction of other nonjudicial strategies
for conflict resolution. Burt, in particular, asks what the
proper role of die judiciary is in addressing fundamental
social conflict. Constitutional scholar John Ely has sug-
gested that constitutional issues to be resolved by the
judicial branch are those (1) that have to do with access
to or undue influence on the political process, or (2) in
which the majority enacts a "regulatory regime" that
favors itself over a minority. Since the question of
school finance systems does not fit either criteria, as the
Illinois courts suggest, die legislative process may be the
avenue for appropriate redress. This view is also conso-
nant with legal theorist Bruce Ackerman's discussion of
constitutional politics, which states that critical social
policy disagreements need to be resolved through long
processes of public deliberation, which tend to clarify
issues and build broader consensus, rather than through
active intervention of die courts. Experience with school
finance reform cases in other states where the state sys-
tem has been successfully challenged would support the
contention diat active judicial intervention may not lead
toward political accommodation.
Implications for Public Policy
What impact does diis decision have on the future of
school finance in Illinois? A number of factors may
impinge upon how school finance policy develops in the
state.
Future Action?
It is unclear in December 1994 whether die Committee
will appeal diis decision to the Illinois Supreme Court, or
whether the Committee will pursue other actions. Furdier
action may be fruitless since die Illinois Supreme Court
was clear in Cronin v. Lindberg (1976), diat issues of
constitutionality of the state school finance system are
properly left to the legislature. There seems little reason
to expect a reversal of diis precedent.
A Question of Legal Theory
The decision raises a basic question in legal dieory
regarding separation of powers and die role of judicial
review in resolving key political questions. Legal schol-
A major impediment to achieving legislative resolution to
Illinois' school finance problems has been the reluctance
of die suburban Chicago legislators, mostly Republican,
to enact any reform that would result in raising the state
tax burden of the region without a corresponding increase
in state aid to dieir schools. The suburban population
feels diat the major financial burden of reform will fall on
diem. Widi both houses of the General Assembly under
Republican control as a result of the 1994 general elec-
tions and with the Republican leadership in both houses
dominated by suburban legislators, the pressures against
enacting a school finance reform package that disadvan-
tages die suburban Chicago area will be even stronger.
The decision may be appealed to the Illinois Supreme
Court, and the court might rule in favor of the Committee
and order the legislature to enact a new system of funding
public schools. However, if the experience in other states
is indicative, this ruling may only be the beginning of a
long battle, not the end. In states like California, New
Jersey, Connecticut, and Texas, the respective state su-
preme court decisions in favor of die plaintiffs in school
finance reform cases have marked die beginning of legis-
lative battles diat have easily extended to five, ten, and
twenty years without successful resolution. Consequent-
ly, legislatures have recognized diat die courts may order,
but diey have few powers to compel compliance.
Many see tliis as the politics of class, where die affluent
in the suburbs will not make additional financial sacrifices
to assist diose who are poor, minority, and urban dwell-
ers. It would be a mistake, however, to see the politics
of class only in an economic dimension. The new poli-
tics of class also involves a moral dimension about whose
vision of die future and of die good life will be dominant.
This takes the form of justifying die reluctance of die
affluent to support schools diat are seen to be in disorder,
where the perception is diat learning is not taking place,
and where drugs and condoms are commonplace.
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to equitable school finance
reform in Illinois is die lack of an empirical link between
funding levels and student achievement. Few are blind to
die advantages high spending levels bring in terms of
facilities and teacher salaries, but we still have failed to
address die question of whedier money makes a differ-
ence. Are children in low-spending districts deprived of
an adequate education? The complaint seemed to assume
as a matter of faidi that money makes a difference in
education and diat unequal expenditures mean unequal
education. The court did not accept this argument. The
research on die relationship between money spent on
education and educational quality has been a conflicted
area among scholars, but recent research seems to suggest
that it depends on how additional funds are spent. Added
funding seems to produce greater student performance
when it is spent on improving the quality of the teaching
staff, not necessarily just paying teachers more. This can
be achieved dirough hiring teachers with higher verbal
ability, hiring teachers widi advanced degrees, and invest-
ing in professional development for teachers. The re-
search also shows diat students perform better in schools
widi a higher number of small classes. Any future initia-
tive to reform Illinois school finance, whether legislative
or judicial, would seem to have to address issues of how
increased funding will be used and what results can be
expected.
If school finance reform is not accomplished through
judicial intervention and the solution to school finance
inequities rests with die political process, major issues
diat must be addressed in Illinois include (1) the regional
politics of die state and the suburban Republican ascen-
dancy in die General Assembly, (2) economic and cultural
aspects of die politics of class, and (3) the lack of clear
evidence diat die addition of more money to the current
education system will produce increases in student perfor-
mance.
James G. Ward is a professor at IGPA and professor of
educational administration and associate dean for academ-
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Education and other children's services are financed publicly
by all levels of government. However, the delivery of these
publicly financed services is the domain of state and local
governments, with local governments highly dependent on
state government for their financing. The financing of state
and local governments presents two broad areas of major
concern:
(1) the fiscal linkage between state and local
governments, and
(2) the structural deficit facing state governments.
The primary issues in the state and local fiscal linkage are
school finance reform and local property tax relief. State-
level structural deficits are of concern because they limit the
fiscal capability of state governments to accomplish meaning-
ful change in expenditure policy. I begin with the fiscal
relationship between state and local governments because it
is the more intractable problem and is itself a contributor to
the second.
State-Local Fiscal Linkages
An issue of some concern is the appearance of cracks in the
fiscal link between state and local governments. At the same
time that state governments fund a significant portion of local
government activities, states constrain and limit the fiscal
prerogatives and abilities of local governments. Policies
often work at cross purposes and diminish the accountability
of government at both levels. The difficulty stems from a
desire to address simultaneously three, sometimes conflict-
ing, goals:
— to relieve fiscal disparities across local jurisdictions,
— to insure fiscally viable local governments account-
able to local voters, and
— to achieve the right mix of state and local revenues
(one that is equitable, efficient, competitive, etc.).
The problems apply to all types of local governments but are
perhaps most germane for school districts because of the
nature of the good provided and the heavy reliance of school
districts on local property taxes. Over 25 years of court
cases and academic studies have led to a general consensus
that local schools cannot be funded exclusively (and perhaps
not even primarily) by the local property tax. The difficulty
is, of course, that local property taxes reflect local property
wealth. In other words, in a system where schools are
totally funded (or nearly so) by local property taxes, the
level of spending on education (and presumably the quality
of education) will also reflect property wealth.
This outcome violates many state constitutions and most
people's sense of fairness. The idea that a child's public
education should not depend significantly on the wealth of
the district where he or she lives, which was first clearly
articulated in the 1971 Serrano v. Priest case, has become an
accepted policy goal around the country. There are nearly
as many variations in interpretations of this goal as there are
states in the union. In several states the focus is primarily
on guaranteeing an adequate level of education for children
in poor districts rather than equal education across the state.
Under this approach the idea is to "level up" the poor dis-
tricts rather than "level down" the rich districts.
The leveling-up approach is often justified by reference to
the second goal listed above—insuring the accountability of
local government. To remain accountable to local voters,
local officials must have responsibility for the financing of
local goods and services at the margin. If, for example,
state government not only funds all local spending, but
decides the level of local spending, then local officials can
justifiably claim innocence if local resident-voters are un-
happy with the outcome. If, however, local government
officials are responsible for any level of spending (and
taxes) above some state guaranteed minimum level, then
local officials are responsible for the outcome and thus
accountable to the resident-voters. In many states there is
concern that local accountability has been lost because of
extensive state involvement in local government finances
both through state grants-in-aid and state-imposed limitations
on local government fiscal powers.
Another component of the second goal is to have "fiscally
viable" governments. This goal is derived from the well-
known Tiebout theory that a system of numerous, competing
local governments results in an efficient provision of public
goods. Consumers choose the local governments that offer
tax-expenditure packages that best meet their preferences,
and local governments produce the goods and services at
lowest possible costs so as to be able to offer attractive tax-
expenditure packages. Such a system of competing local
governments requires that local governments have the au-
thority and responsibility to set spending levels and tax rates.
In other words, local governments must be fiscally viable.
It is easy to see how the first two goals—reducing fiscal
disparities and insuring fiscally accountable local
governments—often come in conflict with one another. In an
attempt to reduce fiscal inequities across local jurisdictions,
states give grants-in-aid (sometimes block, sometimes match-
ing) and constrain local taxing authority. Such state involve-
ment in local finances frequently breaks the link for local
governments between spending authority and revenue raising
responsibility. Local governments can become unaccount-
able and fiscally nonviable. This conflict between the two
goals is most clearly illustrated in the case of school districts
because of the strong desire to provide equal educational
opportunity (thus heavy state involvement) and the equally
strong desire to maintain local control and accountability of
this most important local service.
It is tempting to think that the difficulties in achieving the
first two goals stem from local reliance on the property tax.
But the same problems would almost surely arise from local
reliance on any tax base. Income and sales tax bases are as
likely to result in fiscal disparities as property tax bases. It
remains a fact of life in the U.S., however, that the property
Anna J. Merritt, Managing Editor
IGPA University of Illinois
1007 West Nevada Street
Urbana, IL 61801
POLICY FORUM is a quarterly
publication that presents discussions and
results of recent research on important
policy issues. Manuscripts by university as
well as non-university authors are
welcome. All manuscripts are read by an
editorial committee of IGPA faculty. The
1994-95 committee comprises: David
Chicoine, John Crihfield, Cedric Herring,
and Jim Kuklinski.
tax is the primary local source of revenue. Because it is
more palatable politically, the rhetoric of reform (school
finance reform, state and local tax reform) has been em-
ployed when the underlying goal is property tax relief.
This brings us to the third goal above—determining the right
mix (and level) of state and local revenues. The replacement
of local property taxes with state level income or sales taxes,
a typical proposal for property tax relief, has implications for
the equity of the total tax system. In genera], sales taxes
tend to be inequitable, while income taxes tend to contribute
to the fairness of the tax system by taxing those with a
greater ability to pay at a higher rate than those with less
ability to pay. The fairness of the burden of the property tax
is more complicated to assess, but the general consensus
among economists is that the property tax burden is likely to
be borne proportionally to income. Thus, a change in a tax
system that involves a decrease in the reliance on prop-
erty taxes and an increase in reliance on one of the two
large state sources of revenues would have different
implications for the fairness of the system depending
upon whether income or sales taxes are the replacement
revenue source.
With respect to other criteria for judging changes in the mix
of revenues, similar considerations come into play. In gen-
eral, sales taxes are deemed to be more efficient than income
taxes. In terms of stability, property taxes are generally
more stable than sales taxes, which in turn are more stable
than income taxes. Of course, the details of the design of
each tax influence their scores on all criteria. For example,
Illinois has a flat rate income tax with a very low personal
exemption and no standard deduction, which makes it one of
the least progressive state income taxes.
Clearly the goal of trying to achieve the right mix of reve-
nues (to achieve underlying goals of fairness, etc.) can easily
conflict with the goal of trying to relieve fiscal disparities
through state grants-in-aid. The difficulty is that property
taxes are local taxes, and income and sales taxes are largely,
but not exclusively state taxes. So, a decision to reduce
reliance on local revenues generally implies a decision to
reduce the role of the property tax in the total tax system.
A key question is whether states have the financial capac-
ity (and political will) to provide desired levels of property
tax relief and redistribution among school districts.
Illinois relies heavily on property taxes, and it has great
disparities in spending per pupil across school districts. In
principle, the state foundation aid program for funding
schools (which guarantees through state aid an adequate level
of spending per student regardless of local wealth) would
address both of these issues. However, in recent years the
state has been incapable of fully funding the foundation
program. The difficulties stem from the great demands
placed on state government budgets in recent years in the
areas of health, welfare, and corrections. This brings us to
our second broad area of concern—the structural deficit.
State Structural Deficits
Over the last few decades, partly because of changes in
demand and partly because of changes in federal-state fiscal
relationships, state governments have become increasingly
responsible for providing fast-growing, costly services. In
particular, expenditures on health, welfare and corrections
have been growing faster than the rate of inflation and popu-
lation growth for many states for many years, and these rates
of growth are not expected to decline significantly in the near
future. At the same time, many states are operating with
revenue systems designed for a very different era: an era
when the federal government funded a large share of state
and local spending; a time when the U.S. economy was
heavily industrial and services were a smaller share of total
employment and consumption; and a time when people had
different expectations about the role of the state in providing
services for the needy.
The particulars of the situation differ from state to state, but
the broad parameters of the problem appear to be shared
across the country. The trend growth rate of state expendi-
tures exceeds the trend growth rate of state revenues—this is
the definition of a structural deficit. If a structural deficit
exists, a state will constantly face fiscal crises unless the
underlying growth rates of spending or revenues are
changed. To see this clearly, suppose a state with an under-
lying structural deficit manages to balance its budget this
fiscal year by changes in the levels of revenues and expendi-
tures. Then, if the fiscal system is put on automatic pilot (no
changes to revenue structures or to expenditure program
design), expenditures will outstrip revenues eventually or
quickly, depending on the severity of the structural deficit
problem. A state that has to balance its budget year in and
year out will find itself constantly making tax increases or
spending cuts. But unless these tax increases or spending
cuts also involve changes to the underlying growth structure
of the fiscal system, the solutions will be ephemeral.
There are only two approaches to eliminating a structural
deficit. Either the growth rate of spending must be de-
creased (by attacking the forces driving the fastest growing
expenditures), or the growth rate of revenues must be in-
creased (by changing the structure of major slow-growing
revenue sources). It is quite probable that a combination of
these two approaches will be needed. Indeed, it would seem
not only impractical but also undesirable to solve the prob-
lem of double-digit growth rates in spending on, for instance,
medical services by increasing the rate of growth of revenues
to double-digit levels.
State governments have two major sources of revenue—the
individual income tax and the general sales tax. In most
states the individual income tax exhibits a relatively high
trend rate of growth. This is because most state income
taxes are slightly to moderately progressive in their rate
structures, thus the tax tracks nicely the fast-growing compo-
nents of the income distribution. In most states the general
sales tax exhibits a relatively low trend rate of growth, for
two reasons: first, taxable sales (consumption) tend to grow
more slowly than income; and second, in most states the
sales tax fails to capture a significant amount of fast-growing
services.
The structural deficit problem at the state level has implica-
tions for all spending programs, including education and
other children's services. California and Illinois provide
good examples of the difficulty. In California, in the mid-
1980s when the state's structural deficit first began to cause
major fiscal difficulties, state spending on primary and sec-
ondary education suffered. Since passage of Proposition 98,
which protects K-12 education spending, it is non-entitlement
state spending programs (such as higher education) that are
suffering. In Illinois primary and secondary education re-
ceive the "residual" once other (largely entitlement) programs
such as Medicaid are allotted their shares. In recent years,
this residual has failed to fund education at the level intended
by state policy makers.
Some Guiding Principles and Open Issues
If we put the two broad areas of major concern together—the
question of the fiscal relationship between state government
and its many local governments; and the difficulty of state
governments meeting 21st century spending pressures with
early 20th century revenue systems—we see why state
governments are having fiscal troubles. States across the
country are attempting to do more at the local level (whether
it is providing property tax relief, reducing fiscal disparities
across school districts, or increasing state support for local
governments), while the fiscal ability of state governments to
accomplish anything new appears to be increasingly con-
strained. Pessimism over the federal government's ability to
accomplish meaningful domestic policy reform is common-
place. The message here is that, while the situation for state
governments is not as dire, the prognosis for the future is not
optimistic. An examination of states across the union would
find similar fiscal problems and questions, but as yet there
appear to be no easy answers or solutions to state and local
fiscal woes.
That said, I conclude with several half-baked thoughts on
possible guiding principles as well as a list of open issues.
Guiding Principles
* The quality of public education should not depend
significantly on the wealth of the district or the
student.
* School finance reform should focus on poor, low-
spending districts. The inability of these districts to
serve children well is the problem that school reform
should address.
Major school restructuring efforts should be concen-
trated on inner-city school districts in our largest
cities where adequate education suffers most from
problems such as high drop out rates and unsafe
conditions.
The health of the inner city is determined by the qual-
ity of its public schools. Since the health of metropol-
itan regions is in turn dependent on the health of the
inner city, school reform should be undertaken in a
regional context.
* How do different states interpret the idea that a
child's public education should not depend signifi-
cantly on property wealth in the district where he or
she lives? Are there useful lessons to be found in the
ways states implement this goal?
* What lessons do examples of California and
Michigan—two important case studies of radical
changes in the way schools are financed—provide for
how school finance reform should or should not be
achieved?
Local governments should be fiscally viable and ac-
countable to local voters.
Property taxes are the primary means of fiscal em-
powerment for local governments. State governments
should tread lightly when stepping in to provide prop-
erty tax relief.
What have been the trends and changes in composi-
tion of spending on children's services in various
states in the past several years? How have state fiscal
pressures affected expenditures on children's ser-
vices? What can be learned from these experiences to
create workable strategies for improving the financing
of children's services?
* State income and sales taxes should be evaluated for
possible structural changes that would make the taxes
more responsive to economic growth. For example,
expanding the base of state general sales taxes to
services would not only improve the responsiveness
of the tax; it also makes good economic sense in
terms of efficiency and fairness.
* The experiences of other states—their fiscal pressures,
methods of financing education, and ways of address-
ing inequities—can provide valuable lessons.
How can human service programs for children and
their families be designed to yield appropriate incen-
tives and provide meaningful oppportunities? For
example, most state health care programs for the
needy (Medicaid) do not provide incentives for cost
cutting. As another example, voucher programs for
schools will only succeed if parents have meaningful
choices.
Open Issues
* What creative, cooperative efforts can be fostered
between wealthy and poor school districts to help
finance central city schools?
* In which states is the financing of education working
well? The education finance policies (and political
history of school finance) in these states could provide
possible solutions and lessons for other states.
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Since the early 1980s, an increasing number of books
and articles have advocated strategic planning as a tool
for improving government management. Despite some
anecdotal evidence that public agencies had begun to
utilize strategic planning as a management tool, until
recently there had been little research measuring the
extent of public sector utilization, the rationale behind
its utilization, or the results managers believe have
been achieved by strategic planning. In order to collect
evidence about these issues, Frances Berry, a colleague
from Florida State University, and I conducted a na-
tional survey of strategic planning in state government.
Our results not only provide a description of the extent
to which strategic planning is used in state government
and the outcomes achieved, but also explain the reasons
why strategic planning has been an attractive public
management innovation. 1
Overview of the Study
In 1992 we sent questionnaires to the directors of all
state agencies in twenty programmatic and regulatory
areas (n=987). From this initial mailing as well as
follow up contacts that gave us a complete census in
four program areas, 548 surveys were returned, for a
total response rate of 56%. Completed questionnaires
1 For more details, see F. S. Berry and B. Wechsler, "State
Agencies' Experience With Strategic Planning: Findings
From a National Survey," Public Administration Review 55
(2), March-April 1995, pp. 159-168.
were received from all twenty types of public agencies
and from all fifty states.
The sixteen-item questionnaire assessed each agency's
experience with strategic planning, including its history
in the agency, the types of activities included in the
planning process, factors affecting the decision to uti-
lize strategic planning in the agency, the primary ob-
jectives of the planning process, and the importance of
strategic planning to the accomplishment of significant
organizational results.
Growth of Strategic Planning as a Management Tool .
Sixty percent of the agencies responding to the survey
reported that they currently use strategic planning in
their agency, while 9% said that they plan to begin a
strategic planning process in the near future. Twenty
six percent said they had never used strategic planning
and had no plans to do so, while about 5% reported
they had used strategic planning in the past, but had
discontinued its use. The primary reasons given for
discontinuing the use of strategic planning were
changes in agency leadership, budgetary cutbacks, and
personnel changes in the planning function. Only two
agencies said that strategic planning had been perceived
as a failure.
The survey results also confirmed that strategic plan-
ning is a relatively new public management practice.
Of the agencies currently using planning, only 6%
began their effort before 1980, while another 10%
began using strategic planning between 1980 and 1984.
Beginning in 1985, however, the pace of adoption
increased dramatically, with 47% of the agencies be-
ginning strategic planning between 1985 and 1989 and
an additional 39% adopting strategic planning after
1990. And, as mentioned above, nearly one in ten
agencies reported plans underway to initiate strategic
planning in the near future.
These results—high utilization, low discontinuation—are
somewhat surprising. They suggest that strategic plan-
ning has been widely adopted by state government
agencies and that, for the most part, agencies find the
process sufficiently valuable to continue its use. While
this interpretation may be valid, we offer two cautions:
first, agencies that are not engaged in a strategic plan-
ning process may be under-represented in our sample
and, second, in a large majority of cases, strategic
planning is a relatively new practice and the discontinu-
ation rate could easily increase in the future. Nonethe-
less, the results speak to the rapid and widespread
acceptance of strategic planning as a public manage-
ment innovation.
Why Agencies Use Strategic Planning . Our research
was also concerned with the reasons agencies gave for
the decision to adopt strategic planning. The chief
executive 's experience in another agency was regarded
as important by 52% of the respondents. Forty-four
percent cited the recommendation ofan internal plan-
ning officer as an important reason for their decision to
use strategic planning. Interestingly, about one-third of
the respondents cited a mandatefrom the governor as
an important factor in the initiation decision, although
only a few stated they were legally required to begin
strategic planning. Only about one-fifth of the agencies
said that the experience ofa similar agency in another
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state was an important factor in their decision to adopt
strategic planning. Twenty-eight percent said the
recommendation ofan outside consultant was important
in their decision, while only 12% learned from the
experience of other agencies in their own state. These
responses suggest that agencies are more likely to
adopt strategic planning when an official within the
organization has had a positive experience or when
there is a respected advocate for the process in an
influential position. Traditional sources of innovation,
such as consultants or other agencies within their own
state, were far less important influences on agency
decisions to adopt strategic planning.
What Agencies Hope To Gain. Our results demon-
strate that state agencies view strategic planning as a
way to manage the increasingly difficult challenges
facing them, that they regard it as a tool for responding
to intense pressures to manage their agencies more
effectively. Ninety-six percent of the respondents said
that the desire to set program andpolicy direction was
an important objective of the strategic planning process
and, in fact, 55% percent identified program and pol-
icy direction as their most important objective. Con-
firming the strong pressure for government to operate
in a more business-like manner, about three-fourths of
the agencies said that their desire to emulate good
business practices was an important objective of strate-
gic planning, although only 14% regarded it as the
most important objective for their strategic planning
process. "Cutback management" pressures were re-
flected in the 65% of respondents who identified the
need to reduce expenditures resultingfrom government
budget andfiscal pressures and the 60% who selected
the need to resolve competing resource allocation pri-
orities as very important objectives for the strategic
planning process in their agency. Only 53% of respon-
dents reported that strategic planning was used as a
symbol of their personal leadership in the agency, and
about 40% believed that strategic planning was used as
a response to constituent demands and pressures
.
How Strategic Planning is Used . A growing body of
literature describes a variety of approaches to strategic
planning in the public sector. 2 Although we did not
ask whether or not their processes had been influenced
by this literature, it was interesting to find that most
2 Perhaps the most important of these works is by Professor
John Bryson of the University of Minnesota. See J. Bryson,
Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations .
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1988.
agencies were using methods suggested in the most
prominent of these books and articles. Almost all
(96%) of the responding agencies, cited goal setting as
a significant feature of their strategic planning process.
Ninety percent of all agencies also attempted to identify
and manage the important issues facing the agency.
Almost three-fourths of the respondents said their stra-
tegic planning process included an analysis of the
agency's strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and
threats, and two-thirds of the agencies engaged in: (1)
environmental scanning; (2) stakeholder identification
and management; and (3) program and policy portfolio
management. Among the other activities identified by
respondents, agency visioning and values analysis
processes were most frequently mentioned. Most
agencies seemed to be using an eclectic approach, one
that they were comfortable with and that allowed them
to address their most pressing issues. The results also
suggest that strategic planning methods are diffusing
broadly into the public management community.
What is Gained? Given that agencies adopted strategic
planning as a means to improve performance and re-
sponsiveness, we were very interested in learning what
agencies thought had been gained from the process.
Respondents were asked to rate the importance of each
of fifteen specific possible outcomes of strategic plan-
ning and to select the most important outcome for their
agency. Nearly all respondents (90%) rated both es-
tablished management direction and clarified agency
priorities as important outcomes of the planning pro-
cess for their agencies. Eighty-two percent of respon-
dents believed that strategic planning had been impor-
tant as a guide to policy decisions, 73% said it had
been important in making budget decisions, and 62%
rated it important in gaining supportfor budget priori-
ties for the agency. These percentages reflect the high
priority placed on using strategic planning to help make
policy decisions and to allocate resources and establish
priorities in the budget process.
About 40% of the agencies viewed strategic planning
as important in leading to increased legislative support
and increased gubernatorial support for the agency as
well as improved constituent relations. Nearly 60%
felt the planning process had been important in achiev-
ing a greater commitment by agency personnel to im-
proving customer satisfaction. While not currently
regarded as equal in importance to other areas, im-
provements in client and external relations may show
more significant results over the long term.
Two-thirds of the respondents reported that an impor-
tant outcome of strategic planning was improved team-
work in the agency, but far fewer regarded improved
internal communication (48%), enhanced agency "cor-
porate " culture (41%), and improved staffmorale
(39%) as important outcomes. On perhaps the critical
performance measure, 71% of the respondents cited
improved service delivery as an important outcome of
the strategic planning process. This result tends to
support the literature's argument that the use of strate-
gic planning can have an impact in an important way
on the most important concern of citizens, public offi-
cials, and agency leaders. Finally, one-third of the
agencies said that strategic planning had been important
in achieving agency reorganization, presumably to
realign agency resources and structures to better imple-
ment agency priorities; however, for most agencies,
reorganization was not an important outcome of strate-
gic planning.
Taken as a whole, our findings about the outcomes
achieved by strategic planning present a very promising
picture for strategic planning as a management tool.
Agencies employ strategic planning in order to set
direction for the organization, establish priorities, build
internal and external support, and improve perfor-
mance. Based on their initial experiences, respondents
report important successes in achieving those results.
What Lies Ahead
The history of American public administration is
replete with new management tools that have not pro-
duced the improvements in government performance
promised by their most fervent advocates. Based on the
positive assessments of senior state government execu-
tives responding to our questionnaire, however, strate-
gic planning has to be regarded as an exception—
a
successful public management innovation that is
achieving its initial promise. Moreover, our research
suggests that strategic planning is poised to have an
even bigger and more important impact in the future.
A large and growing number of state agencies already
use strategic planning as a basic way of doing business.
With such a critical mass of agencies on board, strate-
gic planning is sure to gain even greater acceptance in
the future.
While the future growth and evolution of strategic
planning may take a variety of forms, our research
suggests two especially likely possibilities. First,
strategic planning processes could be diffused down-
ward in the organization. According to survey respon-
dents, this is happening already: after the success of
organization-wide efforts, sub-units have begun to
develop their own focused planning processes with
missions and issues that mesh with agency-level strate-
gies. This development will bring both the processes
and outcomes of planning closer to the operational
level where the impact on service delivery and perfor-
mance will be greatest.
The second possibility involves the incorporation of
strategic planning into emerging quality improvement,
restructuring, and reinvention programs. Strategic
planning is increasingly being viewed as the foundation
for more extensive administrative reforms focused on
rethinking and recreating core operations of govern-
ment. According to our results, senior managers un-
derstand these linkages. If state governments can
provide the necessary incentives for restructuring and
reform, we would expect strategic planning to be in-
creasingly regarded as an important and effective tool
for the management of state agencies.
public sector. Agencies that have not yet instituted a
strategic planning process may find themselves losing
out—losing the opportunity to clarify direction, set
priorities, and improve service delivery and losing
external support and budgetary resources necessary to
accomplish their objectives.
Agencies with established strategic planning processes
are less at risk of losing out. However, given the
trends noted in the previous section, they might still
need to extend the process further into their organiza-
tion, to move from strategic planning to strategic man-
agement. This kind of institutionalization has great
potential for increasing participation and for building
commitment to the organizational vision and direction.
Another extension with great potential is the linkage of
the strategy development process to other management
activities like budgeting and performance appraisal.
These linkages ensure that strategy implementation
takes an appropriate place alongside strategy formula-
tion.
Implications for Managers and Policymakers
The findings of our research have implications for
those organizations that employ strategic planning as
well as for those that don't. As noted above strategic
planning is becoming a way of doing business in the
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THE BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENT:
AN ANALYSIS
/. Fred Giertz
The question of whether or not to amend the
U. S. Constitution to include a requirement for a
balanced budget is one of the key economic pol-
icy issues facing the country. Although one ver-
sion of a balanced budget amendment failed, by
a narrow margin, to win the necessary two-
thirds majority in the United States Senate in
early 1995 (after approval in the House of Rep-
resentatives), the issue will almost certainly be
raised again in Congress. In 1996 the balanced
budget amendment will also likely be a key issue
in many senatorial and congressional campaigns
as well as the race for president. If approved by
Congress, the amendment will then be an agenda
item for state legislatures.
To analyze a balanced budget amendment, we
need to look at two conceptually separate issues:
(1) Is a balanced budget a desirable policy goal
for the federal government? and (2) If the an-
swer to the first question is yes, is a constitu-
tional amendment the most effective means to
achieve a balanced budget?
A Balanced Budget as a Policy Goal . An
underlying assumption of any balanced budget
amendment is that balancing the federal budget
will produce improvements in the functioning of
the nation's economy. A balanced budget is
defined as one where revenues equal expendi-
tures over some time period, usually a year. If
expenditures exceed revenues, a deficits results.
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Government debt is the past accumulation of
surpluses and deficits. An annual surplus re-
duces the debt, while a deficit increases it.
Proponents of a balanced budget amendment
hope to achieve basically two distinct results: a
reduction in the size of the federal government
and an increased rate of economic growth.
Reducing the size of the federal government is a
relatively straight-forward, but controversial
goal. Some advocates of the amendment be-
lieve that government has grown too large as a
result of "interest group" politics. They view a
balanced budget amendment as a way of reining
in spending. Note, however, that a balanced
budget does not automatically mean a smaller-
sized government. The budget could be bal-
anced at a high expenditure level through in-
creased taxes. This possibility was addressed in
the amendment voted on in 1995 by not only
requiring a balanced budget, but also requiring a
60 percent majority of both houses of Congress
to increase taxes. This additional requirement
would have increased the likelihood of expendi-
ture cuts rather than tax increases to eliminate
the deficit. It should be noted that a balanced
budget requirement would also limit tax cuts not
matched with spending reductions.
Increasing the rate of economic growth is a
more widely accepted goal than reducing the
size of government. The relationship between a
balanced budget and economic growth is not
readily apparent. At one time, it was believed
that a continually unbalanced budget would even-
tually lead to government bankruptcy. This is
not true for the federal government with its pow-
ers to tax and create money. Others believed
that continual deficits lead to undesirable levels
of inflation. The 1980s showed that large defi-
cits do not always lead to inflation. A tight
monetary policy (leading to higher interest rates)
can counter the inflationary impacts of deficits.
If deficits do not lead to bankruptcy or to uncon-
trolled inflation, why are they bad? The answer
is that the tight monetary policy necessary to
control inflation leads to higher interest rates,
which in turn reduce the level of private domes-
tic investment in the economy. Deficits, in ef-
fect, shift resources from private investment to
the government sector. If these resources are
used by the government for current consumption
purposes (such as redistribution), the rate of
capital formation is reduced. A lowered level of
investment will eventually reduce the rate of
economic growth in the country, although the
magnitude of this impact is subject to consider-
able debate.
The chart on federal deficits suggests that there
has been a distinct change in the character of the
deficits over the last 15 years, measured either in
constant dollars or as a percentage of gross do-
mestic product. Year in and year out since
1980, deficits have been larger than at any time
in our peace-time history. As evidenced by the
chart on federal debt, these deficits have led to a
rapid increase in the level of debt. Most observ-
ers believe that deficits in the current range will
manifest themselves in slower economic growth.
This does not happen overnight. It is a long-
term relationship where the impact is felt gradu-
ally over years or even decades.
Federal Deficits':" 1 960-1 996
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A Constitutional Amendment To Achieve a
Balanced Budget. The case for a balanced bud-
get amendment depends upon two assertions:
(1) a balanced budget is a desirable economic
policy and (2) a balanced budget is unlikely to be
achieved through the normal legislative decision-
making process. Proponents of the amendment
argue that the current incentives facing politi-
cians lead to short-sighted decisions, which
result in deficits.
Since the size of a deficit is only one factor that
influences economic growth (a process that is
still not fully understood), voters may not realize
the implications of unbalanced budgets. As a
consequence, politicians may have a very short
time horizon. Achieving a balanced budget re-
quires current sacrifice in terms of higher taxes
or reduced public programs (both of which may
be unpopular politically), while the benefits of a
balanced budget accrue in future years in the
form of improved living standards through a
process most voters do not understand. A series
of short-term, expedient decisions by politicians
leading to deficit spending may be the best strat-
egy for remaining in office, but may have nega-
tive long-term consequences for society. Propo-
nents argue that a constitutional requirement for
a balanced budget is the best way of changing
these incentives.
Even if a balanced budget is a desired policy
goal, serious concerns arise about mandating it
through a constitutional amendment. While an
amendment might provide greater fiscal disci-
pline, it is difficult to draft an amendment that
provides both fiscal restraint and sufficient flexi-
bility to respond to changing conditions. Most
proposed amendments have escape clauses for
special circumstances, such as wars. They often
include a provision to suspend the requirement
with super-majority approval (often 60 percent)
of both houses of Congress.
A number of other concerns deserve closer
examination and are briefly discussed in the fol-
lowing paragraphs:
Defining revenues and expenditures. Reve-
nues and expenditures may be measured in a
variety of ways. They would have to be care-
fully defined to make the amendment meaning-
ful. For example, should government capital
expenditures be treated differently from expendi-
tures for current consumption? Should a portion
of government interest payments that compensate
for expected inflation be considered a repayment
of debt and not a current expenditure item?
Should the requirement for a balanced budget be
prospective, as it is in many states (i.e., should
the government plan for a balanced budget) or
should it be required on an ex post basis (i. e.,
should the government actually be required to
achieve a balanced budget)?
The time period for a balanced budget. Most
proposals call for an annually balanced budget.
Such a requirement might lead to short-term
destabilization of the economy. During a period
of recession, keeping the budget in balance
would require tax increases or expenditure re-
ductions to offset reductions in taxes caused by
slow economic activity. This would tend to
accentuate the downturn. Similarly, during ex-
pansionary periods, avoiding a surplus would
require tax cuts or increased spending, which
would lead to even more expansionary pressure.
Many observers have advocated a balanced bud-
get over the entire business cycle, not on an
annual basis. A cyclically balanced budget would
accept deficits during recessions, which would
be offset by surpluses during periods of expan-
sion. Alternatively, the goal of a balanced budget
could be established in terms of a "high-employ-
ment" budget. The budget would be considered
in balance if the revenues and expenditures pro-
duced at low levels of unemployment were equal
without regard to actual balance when the econ-
omy was at higher levels of unemployment.
Avoidance problems. Even with a balanced
budget requirement, the political pressures that
have led to long-term deficits would not go
away. Politicians would still have an incentive to
find ways to provide public programs for various
interest groups without raising the necessary
revenues through taxation. It is quite likely that
"off-budget" schemes (such as loan guarantees
and alternative financing arrangements) might
subvert the intent of the amendment. Increased
regulation and mandates imposed on state and
local governments and the private sector might
also be used as substitutes for straight-forward
expenditure programs. These avoidance tech-
niques would be difficult to monitor and would
further cloud the budget process.
Enforcing the amendment. It is unlikely that
an amendment could be crafted to deal explicitly
with many of the issues raised here. This means
that the intent of the amendment would have to
be interpreted and possibly enforced by the
courts, which could create a new set of prob-
lems. If the courts refused to become involved,
the balanced budget requirement would quickly
lose its impact. On the other hand, having the
courts interpret and enforce the amendment
could produce a number of divisive possibilities.
Summary. There is wide agreement that achiev-
ing a balanced budget, properly defined and over
the appropriate time period, would be a desirable
change from the current situation of chronic
long-term deficits. A constitutional amendment
is one way of attempting to provide the fiscal
discipline that has been lacking in the ordinary
actions of Congress and the president over the
last 15 years. However, structuring an amend-
ment to take into account the complexities of
federal fiscal policy is a daunting task—one that
is ill-suited for inclusion as part of the constitu-
tion. While a well-crafted amendment might
lead to improved economic performance, a
poorly drafted amendment might lead to quite
negative consequences. In addition, there also
now appears to be some prospect that the deficit
problem will be addressed directly through nor-
mal legislative action without a constitutional
amendment.
J. Fred Giertz is a professor at JGPA with a joint
appointment in the Deparment ofEconomics at
the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: DOES IT
MATTER HOW THE QUESTION
IS ASKED?
James H. Kuklinski
Within the last decade or so, the emergence of Computer
Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) has made it
possible to imbed experiments within large surveys. A
very simple example will help. Suppose we want to
know whether people are more opposed to affirmative
action programs for African-Americans than for women.
One-half of the total sample, randomly chosen, are
asked, say, whether they strongly support, support,
oppose, strongly oppose (or have no feelings about)
affirmative action programs for African-Americans.
The other half receive the same question, worded exactly
the same way, except now the target group is women.
By comparing the distribution of responses to the two
questions, one can estimate how much difference the
target group makes in overall support for affirmative
action. Moreover, the researcher can also look at certain
subsets of the population—liberals vs. conservatives,
men vs. women, etc. --to see how their responses differ
across the two target groups.
A major hurdle in this area is constructing unobtrusive
measures of racial attitudes. One way to find out about
any sensitive attitude is to ask directly, "Do you favor or
oppose interracial dating?" The problem, of course, is
that the respondent might be inclined to give the "right"
answer rather than what he or she truly thinks. This
phenomenon, called social desirability, has plagued
survey research for decades. We have put considerable
effort into overcoming the problem.
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Suppose that we randomly divide our sample iritathYee
subsets. The first group is asked:
"Now I am going to read you three things that
sometimes make people angry or upset. After I read
all three, just tell me HOW MANY of them anger
you. I don't want to know which ones, just HOW
MANY."
With these ground rules established, the interviewer then
reads a list of three items: (1) the federal government
increasing the tax on gasoline; (2) professional athletes
getting million dollar salaries; and (3) large corporations
polluting the environment.
The second group gets these same three items PLUS A
FOURTH, for instance "black leaders asking for
affirmative action." The third of our three subsets of
respondents gets the same three original items but a
different fourth, such as "a black family moving in next
door." By comparing the mean number of items of the
two treatment groups with the mean of the baseline
group, the analyst can estimate the level of anger toward
either affirmative action or a black family moving in
next door.
Some Substantive Findings
Most of the findings discussed in the following sections
are based on measures of the sort just described. It is
important to note that what follows applies to white
adults only.
Prejudice and Attitudes Toward Affirmative Action .
Perhaps the most obvious question of all is whether
racial prejudice motivates the hostility among whites
toward affirmative action programs for African-
Americans. This is also the most difficult question to
answer. Definitions of prejudice abound, and the
concept has taken on a complexity that did not exist
twenty years ago. We have employed two quite different
measures of racial prejudice: stereotypes, which we will
discuss later, and the unobtrusive measure described
above.
The unobtrusive measure assumes that anger toward the
idea of a black family moving in next door is an
expression of racial prejudice. Comparing responses of
the respondents who received the three baseline items
plus the "black family moving in next door" item with
the responses of those who received only the baseline
items, we estimate that about 12 percent of non-
southerners are prejudiced. Among southerners, the
equivalent estimate is about 42 percent, an astoundingly
high figure.
Recall that a third group of respondents received the
"black leaders pushing for affirmative action" item.
When their responses are compared to those in the
baseline condition, we find that nearly 45 percent of
white non-southerners get angry over affirmative action
and more than 90 percent of southerners do.
Anna J. Merritt, Managing Editor
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These figures lead to two conclusions. The first is that
prejudice underlies some of the anger toward affirmative
action. We have found the pattern in all of our surveys.
(Moreover, we have also found that whites express more
hostility toward affirmative action for African-Ameri-
cans than for women. Again, it would seem the
difference can be attributed only to prejudice.)
The second conclusion is that in neither region, South or
non-South, can prejudice alone explain the anger toward
affirmative action. For some people, hostility toward
affirmative action arises from negative feelings toward
black people; but for many others it does not.
All the research discussed so far in this section asks
people whether certain race items "make them angry."
This is a relatively high threshold. Suppose people were
asked whether they opposed a black family moving in
next door or, alternatively, opposed affirmative action.
What happens to the percentages just reported?
With respect, first, to affirmative action, more than 80
percent of white Americans express opposition. The
opposition, in other words, is undeniably widespread.
With respect, second, to a black family moving in next
door, using the word "oppose" rather than "get angry"
increases the percentages noted above (42 percent in the
South and 12 percent in the non-South) by about 10
percent.
All in all, then, racial prejudice remains a sad and
pervasive fact of American life. But it alone cannot
explain the widespread outcry against affirmative action.
Sources of Antipathy Toward Affirmative Action . If
it is not totally a matter of prejudice, what else
undergirds the strong reaction to affirmative action
among many whites? Based on our studies, I offer two
plausible explanations.
The first is that many whites see affirmative action
programs as unfair. In their view, such programs violate
principles such as merit and hard work. Some people
contend that couching opposition to affirmative action in
terms of merit, hard work, and the like is just another
means~in this case, a legitimate means~by which to
express prejudice. I do not doubt that this indeed
describes some of what occurs. However, an
examination of all the relevant data we have collected
during the past five years does not substantiate the
thesis. Many white Americans genuinely feel that
different standards are being applied to blacks and
whites and that this is wrong.
I will report the results of two experiments here. In one,
we asked people whether (BLANK) should be required
to make it on their own rather than receive support from
government. In one case, the (BLANK) was African-
Americans, in the other immigrants from Western
Europe. In both cases, whether the target group was
African-Americans or immigrants from Western Europe,
respondents overwhelmingly opted for people doing it
on their own. Based on this experiment, at least, people
apply the standard of self-help equally to all groups.
The second experiment was designed to determine
whether the widespread support for heard work and
doing it on one's own in fact reflects a harshness among
whites toward African-Americans. That is, does
adherence to these principles mean that whites oppose
any attempts to help black Americans?
One half of our national sample was asked:
"Some people say that because of past
discrimination, qualified blacks should be given
preference in university admissions. Others say that
this is wrong because it discriminates against
whites. How do you feel—are you in favor of or
opposed to giving qualified blacks preference in
admission to colleges and universities?
The other half received a differently worded version:
"Some people say that because of past
discrimination, an extra effort should be made to
make sure that qualified blacks are considered for
university admission. Others say that this extra
effort is wrong because it discriminates against
whites. How do you feel—are you in favor of or
opposed to making an extra effort to make sure
qualified blacks are considered for admission to
colleges and universities?
The differences in responses to the two versions are
striking. Only one of four—25 percent-expressed
support for the first version, couched in terms of
preferential treatment. On the other hand, nearly 60
percent expressed support for some kind of
(unspecified) extra effort.
This second experiment also suggests a second reason
why whites have expressed so much opposition to
affirmative action—the very term has become a lightning
rod that conveys considerably more preferential
treatment than affirmative action, defined precisely, was
originally intended to give. (In all fairness, the operative
definition of affirmative action has varied over time
from guaranteeing against discrimination to quotas.)
Sometimes political words take on a life of their own,
which may be the case here. (Others, of course, see the
term affirmative action as a symbol of commitment to
racial equality.)
Partisanship. Political Ideology and Affirmative
Action . On surveys indicate that anger toward
affirmative action does not fall along traditional party
and ideological lines among the mass public. Our two
national surveys have found that resentment is spread
almost evenly across people who hold different partisan
affiliations and ideologies. Republicans express no
more anger toward affirmative action, on the whole, than
Democrats. Nor do people who call themselves
conservatives—strong conservatives are the one
exception—look much different than their liberal
counterparts.
We have been talking about the distribution of anger-a
good measure of intensity—toward affirmative action. If
we consider opposition rather than anger, there are some
partisan and ideological differences, but they are small.
Our 1 994 survey included both direct and unobtrusive
measures of anger toward affirmative action. In the first
instance, we simply asked people whether they were
angry over affirmative action. In the second, we used
the unobtrusive measure I described earlier. Our
hypothesis was that the unobtrusive measure would
uncover higher levels of anger. In fact, we found a 15
percent difference, with the unobtrusive measure
identifying the higher level of anger.
We also found a significant difference in reporting
among liberals and conservatives. Using the direct
measure, about 33 percent of the liberals expressed
anger and about 50 percent of the conservatives did.
This is a 1 7 percent difference. Using the unobtrusive
measure, however, 56 percent of the liberals expressed
anger and 59 percent of the conservatives did. In short,
using a direct measure, with all the social desirability
trappings, we find a significant difference between
liberals and conservatives. When we turn to an
unobtrusive measure, we find no difference.
The question, of course, is why are liberals more
inclined to express anger when the measure is
unobtrusive than when it is direct? Based on a thorough
analysis of our data, we believe that liberals fear that
publicly acknowledging their opposition to racial
preferences tags them as a person less concerned about
racial justice than they feel themselves to be, i.e.,
affirmative action has become a difficult issue for them.
Affirmative Action and Stereotyping . One of the
essential psychological processes of all human beings is
categorization. We divide the world into men and
women, students and non-students, liberals and
conservatives, young and old. Indeed, it would be
impossible to understand the world without categorizing.
What makes categorization especially important to the
topic at hand is that categorization often leads to "we-
they" thinking. Thus, for example, the more that white
people think in black-white terms, the more likely they
are to place African-Americans in the "they" category.
(Of course, the same psychology applies to African-
Americans~the more they think in racial terms, the more
inclined they will be to place whites in the "they"
category.) "We-they" thinking, in turn, causes people to
increase negative stereotyping of members of the out-
group, that is, the "they's."
To the extent that affirmative action increases
categorical thinking along racial lines, it follows that it
will also cause an increase in the use of negative
stereotypes among whites. All the available evidence
indicates that negative stereotyping of blacks among
whites is quite pervasive under normal circumstances;
the question here is whether discussions of affirmative
action might unwittingly exacerbate an already serious
problem.
We have tried to answer this question as follows. In our
surveys, one-half of our respondents were first asked to
indicate how much they thought selected negative
stereotypes ("dangerous," "irresponsible," "lazy," etc.)
applied to African-Americans. A second halfwere also
asked to answer the stereotype questions, but only after
theyfirst had read several questions about affirmative
action. We wanted to know whether getting people to
think about affirmative action first would increase the
level of negative stereotyping. We found that it does.
Negative stereotyping was consistently higher among
those who first thought about affirmative action than
among those who did not.
In summary, the reason that affirmative action was
initiated in the first place, racial prejudice, continues to
pervade American society in the 1 990s. This reality
serves as fuel for proponents of the policy. On the other
hand, affirmative action has generated anger among
whites who otherwise support black civil rights; the
potential for their loss of support is just as real as the
widespread prejudice. Affirmative action apparently
also encourages negative stereotyping, which in turn can
reduce support for racial policies other than affirmative
action. The issue of affirmative action is more complex
than both supporters and opponents have been wont to
acknowledge.
James H. Kuklinski is a professor atlGPA with ajoint
appointment in the Department ofPolitical Science at
the University ofIllinois at Urbana-Champaign.
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IMPACT FEES: A NEW METHOD OF
FINANCING URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE
Jan K. Brueckner
The provision of public services to urban residents re-
quires infrastructure investment as well current inputs.
For example, educating a city's young population re-
quires the construction of long-lived school buildings
and playing fields in addition to the hiring of teachers
and the purchase of books and other supplies. When a
city's population is growing and its residents wish to
maintain a constant level of public services, both infra-
structure and current inputs must increase over time.
The city must then decide how to finance the costs of
both. In the latter case, the answer is clear: additional
current inputs can be paid for by the people who use
them, the new urban residents. Since existing residents
make similar payments, all the city's inhabitants can be
treated symmetrically in the financing of current inputs.
Because infrastructure costs are largely nonrecurring, the
choice of an infrastructure-financing scheme is less
straightforward. On the one hand, each group ofnew
residents could be charged for the cost of the additional
infrastructure required by their presence in the city. For
example, the residents of a new neighborhood could pay
for the cost of constructing a school to educate their
children. This scheme involves a large one-time outlay
for new residents while exempting original residents.
However, original residents would have made a similar
payment at an earlier date for construction of their own
neighborhood schools.
An alternative approach requires the cost of the incre-
mental infrastructure to be shared among all the city's
residents, original and new. In this case, the original
residents help pay for the cost of schools in the new
neighborhoods, schools that their children do not attend.
This burden is offset by a previous benefit, however, in
that the schools used by some original residents were
partly financed by their own predecessors. Conversely,
new residents gain from paying just part of the cost of
their neighborhood schools, but they are obligated to
share the cost of future school construction as the city
expands.
Historically, infrastructure financing in U.S. cities relied
on the cost-sharing approach. Moreover, instead of
paying up-front for the cost of infrastructure, cities
typically raised the required funds through the sale of
bonds. Cost sharing then meant that all existing resi-
dents shared the burden of interest payments on previ-
ously-built infrastructure.
In the last several decades cities have increasingly
turned to the alternative scheme, where new residents
pay for the cost of incremental infrastructure. Such
payments are made through land-use exactions, which
are levied on the real estate developers who build the
new neighborhoods. Exactions take two forms: in-kind
provision of infrastructure, and cash payments. In the
first case, the developer is asked to build streets, water
mains, sewers, parks, and even school structures as a
condition of carrying out a development project. While
in-kind provision is feasible when the infrastructure is
"on-site" (within the confines of the development),
infrastructure expansion may be required elsewhere in
the city. Such off-site investment is financed via cash
payments known as impactfees, which the developer
again pays in order to undertake the project.
In their 1993 book Regulationfor Revenue, Altshuler
and Gomez-Ibanez provide a helpful summary of trends
in the usage of land-use exactions. They note that while
only 10 percent of localities in the U.S. used exactions
before 1960, 90 percent did so by the mid 1980's. Prior
to 1960, most exactions were levied in-kind. By the mid
1980's, however, impact fees were used along with
in-kind levies in around 60 percent of localities.
Altshuler and Gomez-Ibanez point out that while impact
fees are sometimes levied according to formula, negotia-
tion between developers and the local government deter-
mines their extent in many cases. Whatever the method,
the level of fees has risen along with their frequency of
use. A Southern California survey cited by Altshuler
and Gomez-Ibanez showed that the level of impact fees
rose by over 500 percent between 1975 and 1983, while
a Florida survey showed a tripling of impact fees be-
tween 1985 and 1991. Altshuler and Gomez-Ibanez
believe that the various types of land-use exactions
account for 5 to 10 percent of construction costs in
fast-growing communities, citing a survey figure of $5-7
per square foot for both residential and commercial
development in the leading exaction states. This trans-
lates into exaction costs of around $ 12,000 for a typical
2000 square-foot house.
The Effects of Impact Fees
Given the growing popularity of impact fees, it is impor-
tant to understand the reasons for their adoption as well
as the likely effects of switching from the traditional
cost-sharing method. Many commentators claim that
impact fees are a response to excessive urban growth.
Anna J. Merritt, Managing Editor
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They argue that when developers are forced pay the full
cost of infrastructure, development looks less attractive,
and urban growth is slowed. Other writers argue that
impact fees are adopted because the switch benefits
established homeowners, who enjoy a reduction in prop-
erty taxes. Another claim is that the switch raises social
welfare because it leads to better development decisions.
Unfortunately, the economic analysis underlying these
claims is incomplete. In a recent research paper, I
attempted to provide a more credible analysis of impact
fees by relying on a theoretical model ofurban growth.
The analysis addressed the following three questions:
* What is the effect on urban growth of switching
to impact fees?
* Who gains when impact fees are adopted?
* Is the switch to impact fees socially desirable?
The answers to these questions are described sequen-
tially in the follow discussion.
Impactfees and urban growth
A key element in the analysis of growth effects is the
notion of optimal city size, viewed from the perspective
of infrastructure costs. To derive the optimal city size,
the first step is to compute the cost of the infrastructure
needed to provide a fixed public service level in cities
with different populations. For example, we can com-
pute the cost of a road network capable of providing an
acceptable traffic speed, and this calculation can be
repeated for cities of different populations. The road
network must grow in size (and its cost must increase)
as population rises, or else streets would become con-
gested. Next, divide the total cost of the infrastructure
by the urban population to compute per capita cost at
different population sizes. This would yield road costs
per person, for example, in cities of different sizes. The
optimal city size is the population where per capita
infrastructure costs are as small as possible. Gener-
ally, economists expect per capita costs to follow a
U-shaped pattern as population increases, with the opti-
mal city size corresponding to the bottom of the U.
My theoretical analysis shows that the effect on urban
growth of switching to impact fees depends on whether
the city population at the time of the switch is below or
above the optimal size. Suppose the city has grown
beyond the optimal size. Then, when impact fees are
adopted, the theory shows that urban growth stops.
After a period of no new construction, the city's growth
resumes, but the population is lower at each future date
than if the cost-sharing method had been left in place.
This conclusion shows that impact fees function as a
growth-control mechanism, as some previous writers
have claimed. Therefore, cities experiencing growth that
is viewed as excessive can deal with this problem by
changing their method of infrastructure financing.
To see why impact fees retard growth, suppose that a
city is larger than the optimal size. Then, the theory
shows that the impact fee, when expressed as an annual-
ized payment, exceeds the annual payment under the
cost-sharing method. Thus, from the developer's point
of view, housing development becomes more expensive
when impact fees are adopted. This reduces the incen-
tive for development, and the result is slower urban
growth.
If the city switches to impact fees when population is
still below the optimal size, a reverse conclusion applies.
The switch causes a temporary surge ofnew develop-
ment. Following this surge, subsequent growth is slower
than it would have been under the cost-sharing method.
Identifying gainers under impactfees
Two groups of individuals are affected by the switch to
impact fees: the owners of developed land (homeown-
ers), and the owners of the undeveloped land around the
city. The question to be addressed is how the switch
affects property values for these groups, i.e., house
values and the value of undeveloped land.
My theoretical analysis shows that if the city has grown
beyond the optimal population size, then the switch to
impact fees raises the value ofall houses. Thus, all
homeowners gain when impact fees are adopted, as
claimed by some previous writers. The reason is that,
when the city has grown beyond the optimal size, per
capita infrastructure payments are rising over time under
the cost-sharing method. Since the switch to impact fees
stops this increase by shifting costs to new development,
infrastructure payments are lower than they would have
been. Because the tax burden on homeowners falls,
house values rise.
The theory cannot predict how the switch to impact fees
affects the value of undeveloped land. The reason is that
the switch affects the timing of development as well as
the level of infrastructure payments, and this added
complication precludes a clear-cut answer. A similar
ambiguity arises when the switch occurs before the city
has reached the optimal population size.
Despite these ambiguities, the analysis tells us some-
thing very important: after a city has undergone sub-
stantial growth, established homeowners have a strong
interest in the adoption ofimpactfees. This interest,
based on the financial gains from higher house values,
gives homeowners a strong incentive to lobby for the
adoption of impact fees. Thus, the theory identifies a
political force that may account for the spread of the
impact-fee method. Interestingly, several empirical
studies confirm the existence of these financial gains by
showing that the values of existing houses increased in
several cities that adopted impact fees (one city is in
Florida and the other in Colorado).
The social desirability ofimpactfees
As is clear from the above discussion, the impact-fee
and cost-sharing methods generate different population
growth paths for the city. Adoption of the impact-fee
method is socially desirable if the resulting growth path
is "superior" to the one that emerges under the
cost-sharing method.
In my theoretical model, superiority is judged according
to the aggregate value ofproperty in the region con-
taining the city. The analysis demonstrates that aggre-
gate property is maximized when the impact-fee method
is used. In other words, any other method of infrastruc-
ture financing, including the cost-sharing method, yields
lower aggregate property value than the impact-fee
method.
The reason is that when a developer is forced to pay the
full infrastructure cost generated by his development, as
under the impact-fee method, the development decision
correctly balances social costs and benefits. As a result,
development of each piece of land occurs at the "right"
time from society's point of view, leading to the optimal
path of population growth for the city. By contrast, if
the developer pays only a share of infrastructure costs,
as under the cost-sharing method, then the full social
cost of development is not taken into account. As a
result, land is developed at the "wrong" time, and the
path of population growth is not optimal. Therefore, the
theory suggests that the spread of impact fees as a fi-
nancing method is in society's interest, as argued by
some previous writers. It will lead to a more rational
pattern of population growth in our urban areas.
My theoretical analysis thus yields three important con-
elusions. The analysis shows that when impact fees are
adopted by a city that has already experienced substan-
tial growth, (i) growth temporarily stops, but resumes
later at a more gradual pace; (ii) house values rise
throughout the city; (iii) social welfare increases. These
conclusions are clearly useful in understanding the effect
of a switch to the impact-fee method.
Administrative Issues
Although it is easy to talk about impact fees in the ab-
stract, implementation of such a system is complex in
practice. To appreciate this complexity, consider the
case of transportation impact fees, which are currently
levied by a number ofjurisdictions in the suburbs of the
Chicago metropolitan area. If a developer proposes a
new subdivision, the county must compute an impact fee
per house, which is then spent to offset the subdivision's
impact on the county's road network.
The traffic impact is computed using transportation-
engineering methodology. The first step is to predict
increases in the traffic levels on the relevant county
roads due to the presence of the subdivision. Standard
formulas are then used to compute a required capacity
expansion for each road. These capacity-expansion
costs are then summed across all the affected roads, and
the sum is divided by the number ofnew houses in the
subdivision. The result is the transportation impact fee
per house.
While a similar systematic approach could be used to
compute impacts for some other categories of infrastruc-
ture, the impact-fee calculations carried out by local
governments often involve a large subjective element.
Guesswork and imprecision often underlie the alleged
magnitudes of impacts. As a result, much impact-fee
litigation has taken place over the years, with developers
contesting the fees they were charged. The courts have
repeatedly stressed the need for a sensible link between
fees and probable impacts, and several standards have
emerged in different states. The "rational nexus" stan-
dard allowed a fairly loose connection between fees and
impacts, while the "specifically-and-uniquely-attribut-
able" standard called for a more direct connection. Both
these standards have been superseded by the standard of
"rough proportionality" between fees and impacts, as
enunciated in a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision.
Administration of impact fees is therefore complex and
likely to generate continuing legal challenges. Given
their political popularity, however, impact fees are des-
tined to become even more widely used. While showing
the likely effects of this greater use, my analysis also
suggests that it is socially desirable.
Jan K. Brueckner is a professor at IGPA with a joint
appointment in the Department of Economics at the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
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THE CHANGING NATURE OF
HEALTH CARE MARKETS: ASSESSING
THE PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS
William D. White
Health care in the U.S. is a vast industry undergo-
ing a major transformation. Over one dollar in
seven of national income is spent on health care.
Annual expenditures exceed a trillion dollars and
have been growing rapidly for decades. While
some 40% of health care dollars come from public
sources, the U.S. has always relied on a market
oriented system for delivering services. Within the
context of this market oriented system, health
policy debates in the U.S. historically have focused
on expanding access to care. However, since the
late 1970s cost containment has emerged as an
increasingly important objective. Cost contain-
ment efforts have been accompanied by a growing
reliance on pro-competitive, market oriented
strategies.
From a public policy perspective, recent shifts in
market organization raise a wide range of ques-
tions. How have health care markets changed?
What, if anything, can we say about the impacts of
these changes on prices, costs, access to care and
quality? What lessons do experiences so far sug-
gest for the future? And what implications do
these experiences have for trade offs between
access and costs? These are very broad ques-
tions. Researchers are only beginning to come to
grips with them. However, recent research, in-
i
eluding research at IGPA, suggests some impor-
tant insights.
Changing Market Organization: From Patient
Driven to Payer Driven Competition
With literally thousands of hospitals and doctors in
the health care market place, there has always
been competition in U.S. health care. But the
nature of this competition has changed dramati-
cally. While the term "competition" is typically
associated with price competition, sellers may also
compete on the basis of non-price attributes, for
example technical quality, amenities (e.g. attrac-
tive hospitals rooms) or accessibility.
Until the late 1970s competition in U.S. health
care markets was "patient driven." Decisions
about where and what care to buy were delegated
to individual patients and their physicians. Most
patients had indemnity insurance, either through
private insurance or public programs. As a result,
there was little incentive for them to shop on the
basis of price. Instead, providers competed for
patients on the basis of the perceived "quality" of
their services. At the same time, non-profit hospi-
tals and other providers also drew on profits from
well insured patients to subsidize care, for example
for the uninsured. The role of third party public
and private payers was limited to passively paying
the bills.
Since the early 1980s third party payers have taken
an increasingly activist role in cost containment.
The result has been a rapid shift from "patient
driven" competition towards what may be de-
scribed as "payer driven" competition. At the
heart of this shift has been a rapid growth in man-
aged care plans in private insurance markets.
Two major cost containment strategies have been
employed. The first is utilization review—payer
review of patient utilization of services as a condi-
tion for reimbursement. The second is selective
contracting. Under selective contracting, man-
aged care plans negotiate prices with individual
providers, often at substantial discounts from pro-
viders official "posted" prices. Providers are
selected on the basis of price, treatment styles,
and clinical performance. Financial incentives are
then used to "steer" patients to these providers.
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Assessing the Impact of Market Changes
Surprisingly, so far there is no clear consensus in
the literature about the impact overall of changes in
market structure and managed care on costs and
quality.
The issues are twofold. First, organizational forms
of managed care have been evolving very rapidly.
Cost savings associated with new organizational
forms, which account for much of the recent
growth in managed care enrollments, have yet to
be documented, while methodological issues exist
about measuring impacts on quality. Second, to
the extent savings have been documented at the
individual plan level, it is not clear to what degree
these savings are due to sorting of patients on the
basis of health risks, rather than improvements in
efficiency.
Experiences to date do suggest a number of con-
clusions about the effects of moving from patient
driven to payer driven competition.
Markets are becoming more price
sensitive:
There is growing evidence that aggressive
payer shopping for care is pushing down
prices. For example, in California, which
has one of the highest rates of managed
care penetration in the country, sharp dis-
counting of hospitals' posted prices has
become routine. Price margins for hospital
services have been squeezed in particular
in markets with large numbers of compet-
ing hospitals.
Health care delivery systems are re-
structuring to contain costs:
There is also growing evidence that man-
aged care is restructuring health care deliv-
ery systems in ways consistent with in-
creased cost containment. Changes in
the mix of primary care and specialist
physicians is an important example. There
has been a high level of reliance on special-
ists in U.S. medicine. This has raised cost
concerns because specialists are more ex-
pensive to train than primary care physi-
cians and because they may have more
expensive treatment styles, which has lead
to calls for the federal government to im-
pose caps on entry into speciality training
programs. Ongoing research at IGPA,
which was recently funded by the Agency
for Health Care Policy and Research, sug-
gests managed care is significantly altering
patterns of demand for specialists and pri-
mary care physicians. Relative incomes of
primary care physicians have surged in
states with high rates of managed care
growth, while income growth for major
groups of specialists has been substantially
lower than in states with low rates of man-
aged care growth. At the same time, over-
all entry of graduating U.S. medical
school seniors into primary speciality pro-
grams has increased substantially, suggest-
ing earnings shifts are triggering major
adjustments in supply.
Providers' ability to pursue non-market
goals is decreasing:
It has often been claimed in the past that if
public reimbursement is reduced, hospitals
will simply "shift" the costs to privately
insured patients. However, aggressive
payer shopping is imposing increasing con-
straints on providers' ability to raise prices.
Ongoing research at IGPA finds no evi-
dence of cost shifting in response to cuts in
Medicaid reimbursement rates in California
since the mid 1980s. Rather, the burden
of cuts appears to have fallen on patients
and providers. The amount of services
received by Medicaid patients has declined
compared to private patients, and hospitals
with large Medicaid populations have been
more likely to go out of business.
Policy Implications
In public policies debates, it has long been argued
that health care is different from other industries.
To a large degree, the case for treating health care
as a "special" case has been predicated on an envi-
ronment of patient driven competition. In this
environment, it has been plausible to argue in-
creased competition between hospitals may lead to
higher, not lower costs, as hospitals seek to attract
patients by expanding services, and that consumers
will not respond significantly to cost shifting or
growing reliance on costly medical specialists.
Recent trends reported here have several impor-
tant implications for public policy. One key impli-
cation is that shifting the locus of decision making
from patients to payers can sharply increase sensi-
tivity of health care markets to economic variables.
Thus, policies facilitating managed care have sub-
stantially increased price competition in health care
markets. This suggests that by promoting payer
driven competition, policy makers may be able to
harness market forces as a powerful tool to ad-
dress cost issues.
A second and closely related implication is that in
an environment of increasing payer driven compe-
tition, policy makers need to re-evaluate the extent
to which market forces may address perceived
problems. As markets are restructured, the need
for government intervention in important policy
areas may be reduced. Workforce policy and per-
ceived imbalances in the mix of primary care and
speciality physicians are a case in point. Govern-
ment caps on speciality training programs have
been proposed as a means of curbing entry in these
programs and encouraging physicians to enter
primary care. If recent findings on the impact of
managed care on the relative incomes of primary
care and speciality physicians and trends in choices
of speciality programs by new medical graduates
are any indication of the future, such caps could be
unnecessary; with the growth of managed care, the
market now appears already to be moving in the
desired direction.
A third, less sanguine implication is that traditional
mechanisms for assuring access to health care
cannot be taken for granted. As aptly captured by
the industry phrase "no margin, no mission," if
payer driven competition squeezes profit margins,
the willingness and ability of providers to pursue
non-market goals may be reduced Moreover,
experiences with cuts in Medicaid reimbursement
rates suggest that policy makers should not rely on
cost shifting to privately insured patients to soften
the impact of rate cuts for public patients and for
hospitals. This point is particularly salient in light
of proposals to reduce sharply the growth of
federal spending on Medicare and Medicaid.
For additional reading on this subject, see:
R. Arnould, R. Rich and W. D. White (eds.)
Competitive Approaches to Health Policy Reform,
Urban Institute Press, Washington, DC, 1993.
D. Dranove, M. ShanleyandW. D. White,
"Price and Concentration in Hospital Markets:
The Switch from Patient-Driven to Payor-Driven
Competition." Journal ofLaw and Economics,
36:1 Part 1 (April 1993) 179-204.
D. Dranove and W. D. White, "Recent Theory
and Evidence on Competition in Hospital Mar-
kets," Journal ofEconomics andManagement
Strategy, ( 1 994) 3:11 69-209.
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TAX$L¥SmtmiS:
EXPERIENCE AND ISSUES
Richard F. Dye and Therese J. McGuire
During the latter half of the 1980s, property taxes grew at
double-digit annual rates for much of metropolitan Chicago.
In the suburbs, the growth in property taxes was driven by
rapid development and population growth, and was reflected
in rapidly growing assessed valuations of property. Early in
the current decade, taxpayers, tax watch-dog organizations,
and state politicians from the suburbs as well as the then
newly-elected anti-tax governor decided that this situation
needed to be addressed. Various types of property tax limi-
tation measures were debated for various parts of the state.
What passed in July 1991 was a limit on the growth rate of
aggregate property taxes for jurisdictions in the five so-called
collar counties surrounding Cook County. Legislation en-
acted in 1995 imposes similar caps in Cook County and
legislation enacted in 1996 offers a local option for the re-
maining counties in the state.
The Illinois tax cap is imposed on all non-home-rule jurisdic-
tions in the affected counties and is implemented by each of
the county clerks. The maximum-allowable tax rate of each
local governmental unit is adjusted downward so that the
aggregate amount of property taxes collected grows at the
lesser of the rate of inflation (as measured by changes in the
Consumer Price Index) or 5 percent. There are various
exemptions or exceptions to the measure, the most important
being previously-issued general obligation bonds, new prop-
erty in the year it appears, and voter-approved increases
over and above the cap. The first year of experience with
the collar county caps was tax year 1991 (the tax extensions
calculated from 1991 assessments, but collected in 1992).
This is a summary of three different research projects on the
effects of the Illinois tax cap law: an inventory of the first
three years of experience with the tax cap for the affected
collar county governments; a statistical study of the rates of
increase in property taxes for jurisdictions subject to the cap
compared to others who were not; and a statistical study of
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school test scores in school districts subject to the cap com-
pared to others who were not.
Three years of Tax Caps in the Collar Counties'
The following table summarizes the results for all 706 af-
fected jurisdictions for each of the first three years of imple-
mentation:
Table 1. Changes in Total Extensions
(percent of prior year extensions)
1991 1992 1993
Allowable for:
Inflation Factor 4.4 2.7 2.6
New Property 3.3 2.8 2.8
Referenda 0.5 0.3 0.4
Bonds (Pre-1991) 1.1 0.4 0.5
Other Factors 0.6 0.3 0.4
Total Allowable 9.9 6.5 6.8
Total Actual 8.5 5.6 6.0
Allowable minus Actual 1.4 0.9 0.7
Potential Extra 1.6 2.7 3.9
(at uncapped rates)
The table presents separate calculations for five types of cap-
allowed changes in extensions—inflation, new property,
referenda, bonds, and other
—
phis the actual change in exten-
sions and the uncapped potential change in extensions.
The material in this section, and sometimes the language, is taken
from Richard F. Dye, "Property Tax Extension Caps in the Illinois
Collar Counties," State Tax Notes Vol.10, No. 3, January 15, 1996, pp.
193-205.
Capped extensions are permitted to increase by the lesser of
five percent or the rate of inflation in the Consumer Price
Index —5.0 percent for 1991, 3.1 percent for 1992, and 2.9
percent for 1993. Expressed as a percentage of total prior
extensions, which include capped extensions phis cap-exempt
extensions for bond service, the inflation-allowed increases
are slightly less than these statutory inflation factors at 4.4,
2.7 and 2.6 percent respectively.
Newly constructed or improved property is not subject to the
cap. The growth rate of new property (phis annexations
minus disconnections) permitted an increase of extensions of
about 3 percent per year.
If districts approve a rate increase by referendum, allowable
extensions increase proportionately. Voters passed rate-
increase referenda in a small number of jurisdictions.
While these increases were quite significant in some individ-
ual districts, they were less than one half of one percent of
the total of all extensions in each year. One of the intended
consequences of the tax cap law is to force local govern-
ments to go to their voters more often.
Extensions to service previously issued bonds and other
enumerated special purposes are exempt from the cap.
Measured as a share of total extensions, this bond portion
will rise with new cap-exempt obligations, but can also fall
when old bonds are paid off. Overall, the net effect of
changes in cap-exempt bonds was a one percent increase in
total extensions in 1991 and one half of one percent increase
in 1992 and 1993. The higher 1991 figure can probably be
explained by the "window of opportunity" in that year to
issue new debt that would be outside the cap. Under the
1991 law, when the pre-existing cap-exempt bonds were paid
off, extensions to support any new bonds would have come
under the tax cap law. A subsequently enacted change in the
law allows for replacement of pre-existing bonds with new
debt.
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The principal "other" factor is the rule that the extension cap
is not based on last year's extensions, but rather the maxi-
mum of the prior three years. This accounts for about one
half of one percent of allowable increase in each year.
The total of the allowable increases was 9.9 percent in 1991
,
6.5 percent in 1992, and 6.8 percent in 1993. But, the tax
cap extension is a maximum, not a requirement. The actual
increase in extensions in 1991 was only 8.5 percent, 1.4
percentage points below the cap-allowed maximum. More
than half of the total number of districts were below the cap
in 1991—for these districts, other political and administrative
considerations restrained taxing behavior. By 1993, actual
extensions were still 0.7 percentage points below the allow-
able maximum. With the combined effects of three years of
caps, more districts are constrained. Also, more districts
could be catching on to the cumulative impact of tax caps
and be less inclined to reduce taxes in one year when the
result is to constrain them in all future years. Still, in 1993
more than forty percent of all districts were below their
individual tax cap maximum extensions.
The final row in Table 1 is an attempt to get an upper bound
on the restraining effect of the caps by comparing actual
extensions to the would-be extensions from the current as-
sessed value times the 1990 tax rate, the last year before the
tax cap. The argument—certainly correct in some cases, and
just as certainly overstated when applied to all jurisdictions
—
is that, without this constraint, local taxing districts would
simply levy the same old rate on whatever the new tax base
is and find a way to spend the money. This same-old-rate
behavior would have yielded an extra 1.6 percent of total
extensions in 1991, 2.7 in 1992 and 3.9 in 1993. Note that
each additional year the caps are in place the restraining
impact compounds.
Another important feature of the tax cap law is its differen-
tial impact across individual local governments. For some
local governments, those with assessment growth at or below
the inflation rate or those levying less than the capped maxi-
mum in the third year, the tax cap has had no impact. For
other local governments, those with substantial growth in
property values and with increased service demands, the
impact of just three years of tax caps may have already
caused significant fiscal stress. Each additional year the
caps are in place compounds the constraints and heightens
the impact on particular districts.
The Impact of Caps on Property Tax Growth
2
Since the imposition of the tax cap the growth rate of prop-
erty taxes has declined in the collar counties, and many
The material in this section, and sometimes the language, is taken
from Richard F. Dye and Therese J. McGuire, "The Impact of Property Tax
Limitations on Local Government Fiscal Behavior,'' unpublished, Institute of
Government and Public Affairs, March 1996.
observers have taken this as evidence that the cap has effec-
tively limited property taxes. But the growth rate of prop-
erty taxes has also declined for jurisdictions in the metropoli-
tan area not subject to the cap, suggesting that the tax cap
may not be the cause, but rather the slowdown in property
taxes may be caused by some metro-wide factor such as the
recession that occurred in Illinois in 1991-1992. It may
seem obvious that limitations on taxes or expenditures should
be effective at limiting the behavior they are intended to
address. However, such limitations are common across the
country and the evidence is decidedly mixed as to how effec-
tive they have been. It appears that the actual design of the
limitation measure matters as do the details of the local fiscal
institutions.
We have data on property taxes and other measures for all
local governments in both Cook and the collar counties. We
separate jurisdictions into an "uncapped" group—all Cook
County governments phis home-rule municipalities in the
collar counties—and a "capped" group
—
jurisdictions subject
to the cap beginning in 1991, which is all non-home rule
jurisdictions in the collar counties. In order to control for
additional factors common to type of jurisdiction, we look
separately at school districts, municipalities, park districts,
fire districts, and library districts.
Our analysis begins with a comparison of the average annual
growth rates of property taxes for periods before (1987 to
1990) and after (1990 to 1992) the imposition of the cap for
both the uncapped and capped groups. If the trends in prop-
erty tax growth rates are the same for both groups, we con-
chide that the tax cap measure has not been effective. If the
trends differ, in particular if the property tax growth rate
falls much more significantly for the capped than the un-
capped group, then we conclude that there is evidence that
the tax cap has been effective.
For all five types of jurisdictions, the growth rate in property
taxes trended downward for both the capped and uncapped
groups. For school districts, municipalities, park districts,
and library districts the decline was greater for the capped
group than for the uncapped group, and the difference in
trends was statistically significant. For these three types of
jurisdictions it appears that the tax cap has been effective at
slowing the growth of property taxes, but for fire districts
the evidence suggests that the cap has had no effect.
The above analysis combines data for a number of separate
years into just two time periods—before and after—and does
not control for any factors other than the type of jurisdiction.
The second part of the study consists of regression analysis
where we attempt to explain annual growth rates of property
taxes with better controls for time effects and jurisdiction-
specific economic and demographic factors.
The regression results reinforce the findings from the trend
analysis—the cap appears to have significantly reduced
annual property tax growth rates for school districts, munici-
palities, park districts and library districts, but for fire dis-
tricts the cap does not appear to have been effective.
For school districts we also analyze differences in expendi-
tures for capped and uncapped groups. For total school
district expenditures the regression results suggest a signifi-
cant restraining impact of the cap, but for the sub-category
of instructional expenditures the cap appears to have had no
effect. These findings imply that the short run response of
school districts to the tax cap may have been to maintain
instructional spending at the expense of non-instructional
spending.
The Impact of Tax Caps on Student Performance
3
The goal of the third study is to determine if the limits on the
revenue-raising ability of school districts translate into con-
straints on the ability of those districts to affect student
performance. The methodology is similar to the property tax
growth study—regression analysis is employed to compare
the performance of capped and uncapped districts before and
after the new law. School performance is measured as
district averages of the scores on the Illinois Goals Assess-
ment Program (IGAP) reading and mathematics tests for
third and eighth graders. Using third-grade scores has the
advantage of comparing districts whose students have re-
ceived only a small part of their formal education prior to the
caps, while comparing eight-grade scores allows us to in-
clude information on how students in each district scored on
the sixth-grade test given two years earlier. We find little
evidence that in those Illinois districts subject to the tax
limitations student performance has fallen relative to student
performance in districts not subject to the limitations. Only
for the district mean score of third graders on the mathematics
portion of the IGAP do we find evidence of relative decline.
The explanation for these results may be that districts reallo-
cate resources away from less productive uses so as to main-
tain instructional services and protect student performance.
These findings must be qualified by noting that caps have
been in place for only a few years and the affected districts
have not, as yet, been forced to make sizeable cuts relative to
desired spending. Also, our evidence suggests that even
though these caps do not matter on average, they do matter for
some districts. For example, for those capped elementary
districts with larger fractions of low-income students, we find
evidence of relative decline in the district mean score of eighth
graders on the reading portion of the IGAP. This could have
troubling implications given the recent extension of the caps
to districts in Cook County, many of which serve large popu-
lations of low income students.
The material in this section, and sometimes the language, is taken
from Thomas A. Downes, Richard F. Dye, and Therese J. McGuire, "Do
Limits Matter? Evidence on the Effects ofTax Limitations on Student
Performance," Discussion Paper 96-13, Department of Economics, Tufts
University, August 1996.
Summary
In Illinois in 1 991 the state enacted a limit on the rate of
growth of property tax extensions for most local governments
in the suburban counties surrounding Chicago. Three studies
described herein examine the effects of this tax cap on local
jurisdictions. The first study finds a large number ofjurisdic-
tions that are not restrained by the cap, but evidence of in-
creasing restraint with each additional year. The second study
finds that, with the possible exception of fire districts, the cap
has had an overall restraining effect on the growth of property
taxes. Evidence from school districts suggests that the cap
may have impacted the composition of spending. The third
study finds that, with the possible exception of third-grade
math scores, student performance has not declined in capped
districts when compared to uncapped districts.
These are short run effects. The long run effects may well be
larger, if the cumulative nature of the tax cap is important, or
they may even be smaller, if the jurisdictions subject to the cap
devise methods of getting around the cap or if the changes in
the underlying economy make the cap less binding.
Also noteworthy are the findings of differential impacts
across districts. Jurisdictions differ in the level and growth of
their tax bases, their historical reliance on bond finance, their
access to revenue sources other than the property tax, the level
and growth in the demands for governmental services, and in
many other ways. Each additional year tax caps are in place
and each additional county on which tax caps are imposed will
reveal more such differences.
Richard F. Dye is a professor at the Institute of Government
and Public Affairs at the University of Illinois in Chicago
and Lake Forest College, Lake Forest, Illinois. Therese
McGuire is an associate professor at the Institute of Govern-
ment and Public Affairs and the School of Urban Planning
and Policy at the University of Illinois at Chicago.
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MOPING ABOUT A MONOPOLY
Shane Greenstein
If you are like most people in Illinois, you worry about
nuances in antitrust policy every time you start your
computer. You just don't know it. More precisely,
it's an antitrust issue mat goes by another name. Call
it "the Microsoft problem"—as in the statement,
"Microsoft sure crosses the line sometimes," or "why
doesn't anyone besides Microsoft make this product?"
or "who put them in charge?"
Outside of a fifteen-mile radius of Redmond, Washing-
ton, Microsoft does not elicit cheers for its every stra-
tegic move. Many users dislike ordering their entire
PC from Microsoft. Many users and sellers resent the
central role this company plays. Indeed, sometimes it
seems as if the world would be happier if Bill Gates
would take early retirement and play board games for
die rest of his life.
The particular antitrust issue is not only of interest to
lawyers, economists and policy wonks. The sooner
everyone understands this, the sooner these discussions
may advance beyond the pejorative.
Attorneys general in several states are beginning to
catch on. Taking die initiative, Texas recently began
an investigation into Microsoft's behavior. What do
you want to bet that several other big states, e.g.,
Massachusetts or Illinois, are not far behind? Initiating
these types of suits is one way for state politicians to
get press coverage in their own state and prod the
federal government to act.
*******
Forum
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What's the Problem?
The key issues are: did Microsoft artificially acquire a
monopoly or behave like a monopolist? Because high
tech firms take extraordinary risks in a rapidly chang-
ing marketplace, should Microsoft face different anti-
trust standards from firms in other industries, such as
chemicals, oil, or steel?
The answers are not as obvious as they might seem at
first glance. It is not a foregone conclusion that
Microsoft has violated antitrust law. To be sure, I
have heard the stories about their overly aggressive
executives and behavior that borders on the unethical.
Yet, the company also plays a useful role by organizing
the industry, guiding development of components and,
on occasion, making very good products. History also
suggests that die answer is not obvious. Dupont, Stan-
dard Oil and U.S. Steel (not to mention IBM), just to
name a few, were all "high-tech" firms who faced
antitrust scrutiny in the past. All were much worse
sinners in their day. Only Standard Oil got nailed.
This is a roundabout way of introducing a fascinating
study that now sits on the web pages of die Federal
Trade Commission (FTC). Written last year by a team
of FTC staffers, the report is tided "Anticipating the
21st Century: Competition Policy in the New High-
Tech Global Marketplace."
Why is it interesting? Because it says much about die
thinking of the brain trust inside the FTC. It is espe-
cially intriguing for what it signals about future federal
policy for "the Microsoft problem."
First, the Facts
The FTC reviews every merger in the United States,
making recommendations to the Justice Department
about whether a merger artificially creates monopolies.
The FTC also investigates joint ventures, stock deals
and licensing arrangements to see if they seem to en-
hance the kind of cooperation that artificially eliminates
competition.
The history of recent decades is simple enough to state.
During the Reagan era, virtually every merger "passed
GO." The Bush White House developed a more active
FTC than Reagan's. Clinton's is more active than
Bush's, but still tame in comparison to the FTC of the
1960s.
In the last eight years many confusing cases concerned
high tech companies. This is not just because electron-
ics companies grow rapidly and merge often. All high
tech firms do this, even those in biotechnology, trans-
portation, and a few other industries with high R&D.
High tech firms also experiment with new innovative
contractual forms, just the sort of thing that catches the
attention of the FTC.
In addition, high tech companies hire expensive law-
yers, the sort who play legal chess better than the aver-
age lawyer. Instead of caving in to government regula-
tors, these lawyers give the FTC a good game. This is
not a game of Trivial Pursuit. Billions of dollars ride
on the outcome.
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So the FTC decided to figure out if they could formu-
late a sensible policy framework for high tech. For
example, does antitrust policy for software need to be
different from antitrust policy for agricultural machin-
ery? Are joint ventures in semiconductors deserving of
less scrutiny than joint ventures in automobiles? Due
to all the market place risk, do the high tech firms of
Silicon Valley deserve lighter legal standards than, say,
the advertising firms of Madison Avenue? And so we
get this report.
In a refreshing show of openness, the FTC held hear-
ings before writing the report, soliciting a broad swath
of opinions from outside the FTC. These hearings
involved over 200 witnesses, many of whom are the
leading thinkers, consultants and hackers in the busi-
ness of making antitrust policy.
What Did the FTC Investigate?
Many of the ideas in the report circulated at research
and legal conferences during the last ten years. Just
because the report's ideas are not new does not mean
they are not useful, however. The report summarizes
and synthesizes. It is a political document, to be sure,
so in a few places it peddles softly where it ought to
have been blunt. Yet, that is a small flaw in compari-
son to the huge value of putting all this material in one
place. Moreover, it is well written.
Most computer industry folk will probably want to read
chapter 9. This chapter is a thinly disguised discussion
of "the Microsoft problem."
Be forewarned that Chapter 9 sometimes takes work to
read. For example, it never names its protagonist.
This was done for a variety of legal and intellectual
reasons, but primarily because antitrust policies should
not be tailored specifically to one company or one set
of circumstances at one point in time.
As it turns out, there is no simple legal principle to use
in high tech. "Monopoly" is simply hard to define.
Nor, once monopoly is found, is it easy to remedy.
There is no simple "get-out-of-jail-free" card.
Two questions largely shape Chapter 9. Should anti-
trust principles for dominant firms be reformulated for
the computer industry? Does the presence of techni-
cally complex networks necessitate a special applica-
tion of antitrust principles?
In computing there is always a place for some firm to
coordinate R&D and to coordinate the development of
components into a single system. Also, it is not un-
common for one firm to get a technological lead,
which no other firm can realistically match. Put these
tendencies together, and vitually every segment of the
industry has a dominant firm.
American antitrust law has always had a difficult time
formulating policy for dominant firms. On the one
hand, there is a presumption in antitrust law that no
single firm should ever be too powerful. (What defines
too powerful? That is a judgment call.) On the other
hand, antitrust law should not be in the business of
punishing firms for being more efficient than everyone
else, nor for being lucky. In addition, in multi-compo-
nent products, such as computing, sellers need to coor-
dinate their technical standards ahead of sales. Most
buyers do not want to waste their time learning about
the guts of every machine.
It is not easy to formulate policy for this type of coor-
dinating activity. For one thing, it can involve explicit
cooperation among erstwhile competitors. Standards
could become (and have become in some instances)
excuses for reducing competition and erecting artificial
monopolies. For another, buyers benefit from the
simplification of technically complex products. So too
do those who sell the products, particularly when the
development of standards lays out a sensible map for
the design of future products.
The Microsoft Problem
Put these two difficult policy problems together and we
get the Microsoft problem in a nutshell. Here is a
dominant firm that openly uses its powerful position to
shape standards across a technically complex system—
a
position that inherently holds the potential for either
benefits or distortions. Whether or not the benefits
outweigh the distortions, however, is a tough call (or at
least it is not obvious to the FTC).
The dominant firm's decisions inevitably produce win-
ners and losers, sowing resentment. Someone some-
where will accuse the dominant firm of misusing its
position and power. Judgment calls will always be
made in an adversarial atmosphere.
(continued on back page)
MICROSOFT—A Chronology
1975: Introduction ofthe first PC. It lacks a monitor and only
blinks on and off. The user buys a kit and assembles it. Paul
Allen and Bill Gates, two undergraduates at Harvard with
substantial trust accounts, see a Popular Electronics article on
the new PC. They panic, believing the electronic age will arrive
without them. They drop out of school to found their new firm.
1977: The Apple II is introduced. It is built in less than two
months by Steve Wozniak and Steve Jobs in a garage in the
Santa Clara Valley in California.
1980: IBM executives decide to introduce their own PC, aiming
to build it in less than a year. Lacking an operating system and
fearing they cannot develop one quickly, they contact Gates
after a failed deal with the leading vendor of the time. Gates
arranges to buy another company's system, altering it slightly.
DOS originally stood for "dirty-operating-system," but is
renamed "disk-operating-system" by Gates. IBM only licenses
DOS, inexplicably giving Gates the right to sell his own version.
1981: IBM introduces its PC design with a large marketing
campaign. The PC uses a "16-bit" chip, working faster and
better than most of the "8-bit" chip systems in operation at the
time. The developer community jumps on the IBM bandwagon.
Within a few years, all competing PC systems fail commercially
except the Apple Macintosh.
1984-85: Fearing the loss of market share to the recently
introduced Macintosh, IBM and Microsoft begin a joint
development project to produce an environment for the IBM
PC. This project eventually leads to IBMs OS/2 operating
system and Microsoft's Windows operating system. The latter
dominates the market by the end of the decade, and Microsoft
breaks off the joint project.
1992-94: Microsoft signs a consent decree with the Department
of Justice over its licensing practices with PC hardware
manufacturers. Industry journals contain accusations that
Microsoft keeps a "hidden code" in its software. Microsoft and
Apple are embroiled in a legal dispute over whether Microsoft
illegally copied the "look-and-feel" of the Apple systems.
Microsoft loses legal battle to STAC electronics over the use of
compressor technologies in its operating system. Others accuse
Microsoft of copying other company's design. The FTC blocks
Microsoft's attempts to merge with the maker ofQUICKEN,
the most popular banking software.
1995: Microsoft introduces Windows-95, a sophisticated, slick,
less error-prone version of the windows environment laid on top
of most DOS-based systems. It captures enormous market sales,
solidifying Microsoft's preeminent position in the PC world. By
this time, Bill Gates is listed as one of the wealthiest men in the
world.
1997: The attorney general of Texas announces that he will
be initiating an antitrust investigation of Microsoft.
What Comes Next?
These policy questions will not be resolved quickly or
easily. Nor are they likely to be settled before the
FTC has to grapple with yet another lawsuit involving
Microsoft that is sure to come. That said, die FTC
staff was wise to raise the general issues now. With
this report they have anticipated future but inevitable
monopoly issues. It should be a useful reference for
many years.
Perhaps in my liftetime the FTC will develop a sensible
antitrust framework for the high-tech industry. Then
again, maybe not. Take a look at the FTC's web page
and decide for yourself. I, for one, am glad to see
them trying. FTC commissioners have a tough job and
often do not have a clue. Though it is no guarantee of
useful action or inaction, government policy based on
thoughtful analysis is much less likely to cause damage.
Shane Greenstein is an associate professor at the Insti-
tute of Government and Public Affairs and the Depart-
ment of Economics at the University of Illinois,
Urbana-Champaign.
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IMPLICATIONS OF "ANY
WILLING PROVIDER" LAWS
Carol J. Simon
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would accept me. .
.
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Motivated by the search for cost control in health care
spending, the U.S. has seen a dramatic rise in the use
of managed care. By 1995 fewer than 4% of all pri-
vately insured individuals remained in traditional fee-
for-service health insurance plans — i.e. plans which
lacked the management techniques that have become
associated with "managed care" organizations (MCOs).
Furthermore, by 1996 nearly 85% of all patient-care
physicians were under some contractual relationship
with a managed care organization such as an HMO,
PPO or POS plan. Illinois ranks solidly in the middle
of the nation in terms of managed care penetration and
recent rates of growth.
With the growth of managed care has come a parallel
increase in activity in the regulatory arena. Respond-
ing to demands from consumers — and providers — for
"protection," state legislatures have debated literally
hundreds of laws aimed at controlling how managed
care plans operate, the information they provide to
patients, and which doctors, hospitals or pharmacies
they can or can not include in their "networks."
This Policy Forum reviews the rationale behind "any
willing provider" and "freedom of choice" laws and
summarizes findings from recent IGPA research on
their impact. While the exact nature of laws vary
across states, AWP/FOC statutes share the following
basic characteristics:
• Any Willing Provider: Any provider — MD, hos-
pital
,
pharmacy ~ who is willing to abide by the
terms of the managed care plans' contract and
meets minimum standards and/or credentials must
be given a contract with the MCO and allowed to
practice in the MCO network.
• Freedom of Choice/Fair Reimbursement: FOC
restricts or eliminates the right of insurers to limit
patients' choice of providers. Fair reimbursement
limits the ability of plans to set different reimburse-
ment and coinsurance rates for care from network
versus non-network providers. States with statutes
have set the maximum differential at 15 - 50%.
These laws restrict the ability of plans to contract with
providers selectively. They also limit the extent to
which MCOs can provide financial incentives that
"steer" patients toward the selected providers. For
example, it is not uncommon for an HMO to reimburse
patients 100% for the costs of care obtained from "in-
network" physicians, but at a much lower rate — 50%,
or possibly zero ~ for visits to doctors who are not
under contract with the HMO.
So, why are these laws important? In part, because
they are becoming increasingly prevalent. With the
exception of Virginia, which has had an AWP provi-
sion since 1983, the laws affecting providers have been
enacted in the past 6 years. As of 1995, 31 states had
enacted some type of legislation that potentially pre-
empts the ability of managed care plans to direct pa-
tients to a selective subset of providers: 14 states,
including Illinois, had AWP or FOC laws that applied
to physician services, while 22 states had laws that
applied to pharmacy services. In 1996 half of all states
debated passing new or expanded legislation.
Managed Care Is As Managed Care Does
To understand why AWP/FOC is at the heart of man-
aged care operations it is important to look at what
managed care is and how it works. Managed care is a
catchall term used to describe a variety of health insur-
ance arrangements that depart from "traditional" in-
demnity insurance. Managed care may include any or
all of the following practices:
1) Selective contracting & "Steering ":
A payer contracts with a subset of an area's provid-
ers on the basis of price discounts, treatment styles,
and willingness to accept innovative payment
schemes. The plan then uses financial incentives to
"steer" patients to these providers, typically reim-
bursing for services from out-of-plan providers at a
lower rate or refusing to pay for them at all.
2) Utilization Review:
A payer requires providers to justify treatment rec-
ommendations and denies payment for services
deemed inappropriate. Almost all MCOs and many
loosely managed indemnity insurance plans use UR
in varying degrees.
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3) Innovative Payment Schemes:
A payer departs from traditional fee-for-service
payment, typically by asking providers to bear fi-
nancial risk, for example through capitation (e.g.
fixed annual or monthly fee per patient in exchange
for provision of services on an as-needed basis).
While viewed as one of the more effective cost-
containment techniques, currentiy less than 10% of
patient care is paid by capitation, usually associated
with HMO contracts.
According to 1995 data, over 70% of privately insured
Americans are enrolled in health plans that significantly
"manage" care: 29% in PPOs, 23% in Group and IPA
model HMOs, 14% in point-of-service plans and 5% in
staff-model HMOs. Virtually all Preferred Provider
Organizations (PPOs) and Point of Service (POS) plans
contract with selected panels of providers. Most
HMOs also rely on contracts with providers. Only
staff-model HMOs typically employ physicians and
own hospitals. In short, in over 90% of the managed
care market, covering nearly 100 million Americans,
the system is held together by contracts between plans
and independent providers.
Contracts — who's got them and what they stipulate —
then, become key in evaluating a whole host of policy
questions. Proponents of AWP/FOC argue that the
shift from patient-driven to payer-driven competition in
health care has shifted the balance of power to profit-
driven insurance and managed care companies. State
legislation, they assert, is required to prevent qualified
providers from being shut out of managed care net-
works and to protect the patient's choice of and access
to providers. Opponents of AWP/FOC counter that
selective contracting and financial incentives enable
managed care plans to achieve cost-savings and ad-
vance quality of care. In this spirit, opponents of AWP
claim that managed care regulation is nothing more
than the thinly disguised "capture" of state officials by
established providers who stand threatened by competi-
tion from the more efficient MCOs.
Reviewing the Arguments: Pro and Con
The arguments behind the pros and cons of AWP legis-
lation are relatively straightforward and revolve around
the question of whether selective contracting works for
or against consumer welfare and efficiency. Advocates
of AWP assert that large managed care plans exercise
buying power in the marketplace. Buying power can
be beneficial when it is used to negotiate low prices for
consumers. But lack of competition can also lead to
less than desirable levels of care in which too few
providers are employed and the fees/prices that they
pay to physicians, hospitals and other providers are
pushed below competitive rates. Hence, AWP and
FOC laws are typically championed by provider groups
who are concerned that they are being "unfairly"
squeezed out of the market by managed care plans that
refuse to grant them contracts to serve patients.
The major proponents of AWP laws have been state
medical societies, non-physician provider groups and
retail pharmacy lobbies. Not all state medical societies
have pushed for AWP legislation, reflecting a split
between the incentives of those physicians who pres-
ently have managed care contracts, and who would
likely suffer losses if entry requirements were eased,
versus those physicians who lack contracts and com-
pete with managed care providers. Not surprisingly,
physician support for AWP legislation has generally
been strongest in states where managed care growth is
low but growing rapidly -- such as Nebraska, Texas
and Arkansas. The neutral position adopted by the
Montana Medical Association is largely credited with
the demise of that state's AWP legislation.
From the perspective of consumers, it is argued that
"open panels" and broad, inclusive managed care net-
works increase consumer welfare by improving patient
access to medical care, reducing the costs of locating
and getting to appropriate providers, and preserving
choice.
Opponents of AWP and FOC laws counter that the
mandates create costly problems for managed care
networks — essentially undermining the management
and incentive tools they rely upon to promote effi-
ciency and cost-savings. First, managed care plans
frequently limit the number providers and mix of spe-
cialists in the plan in order to enhance the effectiveness
of gate-keeping arrangements. AWP laws can impinge
on the ability of the plan to promote the use of primary
care in lieu of specialty care. Second, the administra-
tive costs associated with operating a network may rise
under AWP statutes. Data collection, review, con-
tracting and administrative expenses are largely deter-
mined by the number of providers rather than the num-
ber of patients. This implies that there are natural cost-
savings if a plan can concentrate more patients over
fewer providers.
Concentrating market share among fewer providers
may allow the managed care plan to increase its lever-
age in negotiating discounts and in adherence to plan
protocols. Managed care plans contend that physicians
are willing to accept discounted fees only because they
expect an increase in patient volume as a result of
panel participation. In fact, joining a managed care
plan can be a cost-effective way for physicians to ex-
pand their practices. Therefore, to the extent that
AWP laws increase provider participation without
commensurate increases in patient volume, managed
care volume per provider will fall. Under this sce-
nario, plans would not be able to promise large in-
creases in patient volume to plan members, and physi-
cians, in turn, will be less willing to accept discounted
fees — raising managed care costs and ultimately pre-
miums.
So, What's the Evidence?
Many of the costs that are ascribed to AWP laws result
from the presumption that many more providers will
join MCOs if AWP laws are in place. New providers
admitted into the network will essentially take away the
patients of incumbent providers, leading to a loss of
administrative scale economies and reducing the ability
of plans to negotiate fee discounts.
To date, there have been no studies of the direct costs
of AWP based on empirical evidence. Managed care
advocacy groups have speculated that AWP would
increase the number of physicians and providers in
managed care plans by 20-50 percentage points, lead-
ing in turn to cost and premium increases of 9-28%.
IGPA Research
Even though we lack evidence on the direct costs of
AWP, there are other ways of gauging its impact —
namely by asking whether more physicians have man-
aged care contracts in AWP states, and whether the
characteristics of physicians under contract have
changed. In a current study, I use data from a nation-
ally representative survey of physicians to do just that.
Key findings include:
• Physician participation in managed care con-
tracts is significantly greater in states with AWP
statutes (controlling for other factors that affect
participation). This is particularly noteworthy
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since AWP states had below-average contracting
rates in the year preceding AWP passage. The sta-
tistical analysis suggests that AWP legislation in-
creases participation rates by approximately 10
percentage points.
AWP legislation does not alter the ability of man-
aged care plans to restrict specialist participation
in panels. It is interesting that even in the non-
AWP states there is no clear-cut pattern between
specialty designation and the likelihood that a physi-
cian is offered, and accepts a contract.
Physicians who participate in managed care are
different from their peers. In AWP states, physi-
cians under contract tend to be somewhat older, less
often board certified, more often in solo practice
and have reported more instances of malpractice
lawsuits.
AWP legislation does not significantly reduce the
revenues that participating physicians earn from
managed care. This suggests that managed care
patient volumes are not significantly eroded by
AWP, which is important since many of the costs
ascribed to AWP legislation arise from assuming
that the number, or share, of managed care patients
per physician will fall.
Discussion
These results have important implications for policy,
and raise additional questions for further research.
While there has been tremendous growth in managed
care, most recent growth has been in the form of net-
work models such as PPOs and IPAs and point-of-
service plans. The attraction of network managed care
is that it preserves greater choice of providers, which
is valued by consumers.
Increasing consumer choice is also the motivation
behind much of the state legislation aimed at managed
care. But choice comes at a cost. Research suggests
that network managed care may not generate signifi-
cant cost-savings: when savings are documented, they
are most frequently associated with plans that have
tight panels of providers who have a significant finan-
cial stake in the cost-effectiveness of treatment. AWP
legislation and other initiatives to "open" panels and
mandate "point-of service" options likely loosen the
MCO's ability to contain costs.
The results presented above suggest that AWP has had
modest effects on increasing physician contracting with
MCOs, and that the characteristics of the types of
physicians who contract with MCOs may change under
AWP. The results do not indicate what these changes
mean for access and the quality of care.
For the most part, the early adopters of AWP legisla-
tion were states that experienced early and rapid
growth in managed care. How AWP affects the long-
run competitiveness of managed care plans and its
potential effects in more mature managed care markets
is an open question for further research.
Carol J. Simon is an associate professor at the Institute
of Government and Public Affairs and in the School of
Public Health at the University of Illinois, Chicago.
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The Bad Side of Intergovernmental
Competition: Tax Competition and
the "Race to the Bottom"
Jan K. Brueckner
Economists and political scientists have long recog-
nized that consumers benefit from competition be-
tween governmental units. These benefits are clearest
at the local level in a large metropolitan area like
Chicago. Because a big metro area may contain a
hundred or more municipalities and scores of school
districts, a household has a huge range of choice when
it comes to consumption of public services. A house-
hold that wants expensive schools can choose to live in
a high-spending district, paying a correspondingly high
tax bill. A household with a lower demand for educa-
tion can easily find a school district where spending
and taxes are more moderate. Similarly, households
that want a high level of public safety or lavish parks
can usually find a city that provides such services,
although they must pay a price in higher taxes. Thus,
the existence of many competing local governments
allows households to "vote with their feet," moving to
a jurisdiction that provides the public spending they
desire. As a result, a large metro area functions like a
"marketplace" for public services, a consequence of
the wide range of choice it offers.
The household's ability to vote with its feet also ex-
poses local governments to a kind of market disci-
pline. School districts and cities that are inefficient in
their use of consumer tax dollars will pay a price.
Households will move to well-managed jurisdictions
that can deliver the same services for a lower tax cost.
Because of this threat, local-government managers
have an incentive to spend their tax revenue wisely,
just as if they were managing a private business that
competes for customers.
At a higher level of government, the same market
discipline may also punish state governments that
provide a poor level of services given the taxes they
charge. Households and business firms may shun
states with bloated, inefficient governments in favor of
those where the public sector is "lean and mean."
Tax Competition
Although intergovernmental competition is good, gen-
erating benefits for consumers and businesses, it also
has a bad side. The undesirable effects are most
easily seen by focusing on a particular example of
competitive behavior: competition among state govern-
ments for investment in automobile production facili-
ties. In the last decade or so, many foreign car manu-
facturers engaged in highly publicized searches for
new U.S. assembly-plant sites. Recognizing the eco-
nomic benefits of such investment, many state govern-
ments offered the car companies costly incentive pack-
ages. The packages typically included abatement of
state and local taxes, subsidization of worker-training
expenses, and investment in plant-related infrastruc-
ture. The value of an incentive package was typically
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is the name economists have given to this competitive
process.
Because no state wanted to be uncompetitive in the
battle for investment, states tended to match one an-
other's incentive packages. The end result was that
the various packages received by a given automobile
company looked similar. Because of this, most firms
appeared to choose their assembly-plant locations
mainly on the basis of the state's innate characteris-
tics, including labor cost, union activity, and access to
the transportation network. This conclusion is sup-
ported by the fact that the assembly plants are scat-
tered across the central and southeastern U.S., follow-
ing a pattern similar to the one that would have
emerged in the absence of incentives.
Even though tax competition probably had little effect
on location decisions, it was costly for the states.
Initially, infrastructure and worker-training outlays
took money away from other state programs. In
addition, the ongoing abatement of taxes means that
states continue to forgo the revenue from
assembly-plant investment, even though a fair share of
this investment would have landed within their borders
anyway.
The upshot is that the pattern of investment and jobs is
similar to what it would have been otherwise, but
states have less tax revenue to spend on services.
While the automobile firms are clear gainers, the
ultimate losers are households and other firms, who
must settle for a lower level of state services without
enjoying any offsetting benefits.
One could argue that high-profile state incentive pack-
ages constitute a "drop in the bucket" relative to the
overall magnitude of state budgets. Thus, while tax
competition is bad in principle, its effects may not be
quantitatively significant. The response to this argu-
ment is that tax competition is likely to affect more
than just the occasional state incentive package. It
may play a role in the determination of a host of taxes
at both the state and local levels.
To see this, suppose that a local school district is
considering whether to raise its property-tax rate in
order to improve the quality of instruction. In its
deliberations, the school board may be sensitive to the
effects of its choice on local investment. In particu-
lar, it may be aware that pending decisions regarding
the construction of apartment buildings or office com-
plexes may be influenced by the local tax burden. If
the local property-tax rate is raised, these projects may
be canceled and relocated to an adjacent school district
whose tax rate is stable. Therefore, the school board
recognizes that its tax base may shrink when taxes are
raised, a consequence of mobile investment moving to
escape the higher tax burden.
The threat of tax-base erosion may lead the school
board to forgo the property-tax increase, settling in-
stead for the current quality of instruction. Every
school board, however, is thinking along the same
lines. Each board is hesitant to raise its property-tax
rate, fearing a loss of tax base. In effect, each school
board is trying to keep its tax rate low in order to
preserve and attract investment. Therefore, although
the setting is different, the behavior of these school
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm. districts is just like that of state governments engaged
in an incentive war.
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no investment would relocate and residents would get
better schools in return for a tax increase they would
find worth paying.
This argument suggests that the undesirable effects of
intergovernmental competition, which are transparent
at the state level, may also show up at the local level.
While economists have extensively explored the theory
behind this idea, no hard empirical evidence exists
showing whether underspending actually occurs or
whether the effect is quantitatively significant. Never-
theless, it is important to understand that the lessons
learned from observing the state incentive war may
have much broader applicability.
The Race to the Bottom
The basic idea underlying tax competition applies in an
entirely different policy arena: the choice of welfare
benefits by states. Instead of focusing on mobile
investment, which relocates in response to tax differ-
entials, this new application focuses on mobile welfare
recipients, who may move between states in response
to differences in welfare benefits.
The academic literature on welfare migration has
mixed findings, with some studies showing that the
poor tend to migrate to states with better benefits and
other studies showing no tendency to migrate.
Policymakers, however, seem to believe that welfare
migration is a significant phenomenon that may re-
quire policy intervention. Wisconsin's minimum
length-of-residency requirement for welfare recipients,
for example, is designed to deter migration of the poor
from the less-generous (and adjacent) state of Illinois.
What is the effect of welfare migration on state wel-
fare benefits? To answer this question, suppose (as
do most economists) that welfare programs exist be-
cause of altruism. In other words, well-off house-
holds are willing to give up some of their income to
raise the living standard of the poor. Now imagine
that the well-off residents of a state are trying to de-
cide on the size of the welfare benefit paid to each
poor household in the state. In doing so, the well-off
residents compare the taxes they pay to the altruistic
gains from helping the poor. As the welfare benefit
goes up, the tax payment of a well-off resident rises,
but the magnitude of the increase depends on whether
the poor migrate. If the poor do not migrate, then the
tax payment rises only because each of a fixed number
of poor households gets more money. However,
when welfare migration occurs, the size of the state's
poor population grows as its welfare benefit becomes
more generous. Each well-off resident's tax payment
then rises for two reasons: (i) the benefit per poor
household is higher; (ii) a greater number of poor
households receive benefits.
Therefore, when the poor migrate, an increase in the
welfare benefit leads to a much bigger increase in
taxes than if the poor did not migrate. Greater gener-
osity expands the welfare rolls, escalating the tax
burden on well-off residents. Since generosity is thus
more "costly" with welfare migration, the well-off
residents rationally select a lower levelfor the state
welfare benefit. To avoid becoming a "welfare mag-
net," each state is not as generous as it otherwise
might be, an outcome that has been dubbed the "race
to the bottom."
To see the parallel to tax competition, observe that low
welfare benefits are intended to repel the poor in the
same way that low taxes are intended to attract invest-
ment. Recall that low taxes ultimately fail to achieve
their goal of luring investment because every state
follows the same policy. In the same fashion, because
welfare payments are depressed in all states given the
fear of migration, each state ends up with its fair share
of the poor population. Thus, no state is able to main-
tain a smaller poor population by keeping its benefits
low, and each ends up being less generous than it
would have liked to be. Welfare benefits are too low,
for no good reason.
One solution to this problem is offered by policies like
Wisconsin's residency requirement, which are de-
signed to remove the incentive for welfare migration.
Without the threat of a swelling poor population, a
state's well-off residents can exercise their altruism
without the prospect of a mushrooming tax burden.
Another solution involves federal intervention. An
extreme form of intervention would involve a federal
takeover of the welfare system, with benefits set uni-
formly across states. Under a less-extreme approach,
the federal government would subsidize state welfare
payments. Since welfare migration artificially raises
the "cost" of higher welfare benefits, a federal subsidy
that lowers this cost will short-circuit the race to the
bottom, maintaining a higher level of benefits.
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The old welfare system that was dismantled by Con-
gress in 1996 contained exactly this type of provision.
A key element of the system was a matching-grant
formula under which the federal government rebated to
each state a fixed percentage of its outlays on welfare.
The federal government picked up 75 percent of wel-
fare costs for poor states, while paying half the costs
of rich states. The benefit levels, however, were
controlled by the individual states, allowing welfare
payments to vary across states according to the in-
comes and degree of altruism of their well-off resi-
dents.
This system boosted state spending on welfare beyond
the levels that would have been chosen in its absence,
tending to defuse the race to the bottom. By contrast,
under the new block grant system, states are responsi-
ble for 100 percent of each dollar paid beyond the
federal contribution. Because the states must pay the
entire cost of extra welfare spending, state contribu-
tions will fall relative to the old system. Congress
understood this, because it placed a floor under state
contributions equal to 80 percent of their level under
the old system.
Although its proponents argue that the new block grant
system will give the states more autonomy in running
their welfare programs, allegedly raising efficiency,
the incentives built into the system are wrong. As a
result, it is likely that we will observe a new race to
the bottom.
Conclusion
Intergovernmental competition is good because it
gives households a wide range of public-service
choices, and because it exposes government bureau-
crats to the discipline of a market-style system. But
intergovernmental competition has a bad side as well.
This bad side emerges when governments try to adjust
their policy instruments to control the size of a mobile
tax base or a mobile welfare population. Because all
governments behave in the same way, these efforts
are ultimately futile. With the intended effects never
materializing, the policy instruments end up being set
at the wrong level. Taxes tend to be too low, and
welfare benefits are insufficiently generous. While
little can be done to correct the problem of artificially
low taxes, welfare benefits can be raised through a
federal matching-grant system. Unfortunately, wel-
fare reform has just replaced such a system with an
inferior one.
Jan K. Brueckner is a professor in IGPA and the
UIUC Department of Economics.
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The New Pattern of Power in Illinois:
Effective Government, Deadlock, or
Tyranny?
by Michael Caldwell
The recent impasse between Governor Jim Edgar and the
Illinois legislature over school funding, and its half-a-loaf
resolution, have left some Illinoisans wondering again if
their state government is caught in a deadlock, unable to
resolve major issues because of conflict between its
legislative and executive branches. Ironically, some
observers think that this deadlock across branches results
from the centralization of power within the legislature. As
the four legislative party leaders—dubbed "the Four Tops"
by journalists—have tightened their command of both
House and Senate, the General Assembly seems to some
less able to produce effective policy than ever. This
centralization seems to have produced a distinctive pattern
of policymaking in Illinois, in which the content of
important laws is set in negotiations between the governor
and legislative leaders. According to longtime statehouse-
watcher Charlie Wheeler, when legislators voted on the
budget in early June, "there wasn't even a budget
document available for backbench legislators to look at."
Centralization of power in the legislature has made these
governor-leader negotiations more important because
legislative leaders can now bargain on behalf of their
caucuses. Such negotiations existed in the past, but
legislators and lobbyists widely agree that other patterns—
in which coalitions are built among individual legislators
or deals are made between the governor and the mayor of
Chicago—seem to be less common than they were. We
might call the new pattern of power centralized
bargaining.
Insiders don't agree, however, about what this means for
the public. The centralized bargaining pattern may lead to
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deadlock: Illinois has had a Republican governor and a
Democratic majority in at least one chamber for all but two
years since 1976. It may lead to tyranny, either of
legislative leaders over members or of the interest groups
who back the leaders over the state. But it may also lead to
effective government, by enabling leaders to make hard
decisions without having to worry that the painful parts of
their bargains will be pulled apart on the Assembly floor.
How did this pattern come about? How does it affect
policymaking? Should the institutions that govern us be
changed, and how?
How It Got This Way
Legislative Centralization. Though Illinois is associated in
some minds with strong parties, the Illinois legislature did
not have especially cohesive parties thirty or forty years
ago. When political scientist Belle Zcllcr compared the
strength and cohesiveness of state legislative parties in
American State Legislatures in 1954, she classified
Illinois' parties as no more than "middling" in
cohesiveness, not in the same league as party-disciplined
states like Connecticut and Rhode Island. Today, Illinois
stands as a prime example of the centralization of power in
the hands of party leaders. In the past, to be sure, the
Democratic contingent from Chicago often marched in
lockstep at the mayor's behest—but that was to orders that
came from outside the legislature. Republican legislators
often followed instructions from Republican governors—
another outside authority. That kind of centralization
vanished with the decline of party machines.
Visit the IGPA web page at: http://www.igpa.uiuc.edu
It's different today. Legislators and lobbyists generally
agree that since about 1980 the General Assembly has
developed a new form of centralization, one in which
partisan authority arises in Springfield, within the
legislative caucuses themselves, rather than from county
machines. One striking piece of evidence for this
centralization is the extraordinary extent to which the
Assembly's staff is under the control of party leaders.
Thirty years ago there wasn't much staff; now more than
200 people work directly for the legislature. But, in
contrast to the practice in the US Congress, the staff works
mostly for party leaders. While only 2% of congressional
staffers work for leaders, about half of Illinois staffers do;
and informed sources say that many of the committee
staffers are appointed by and responsive to the party leaders
as well. Unlike their counterparts in other large states,
Illinois backbenchers have no staff of their own.
How did this centralization come about? Springfield
insiders tend to offer one of four explanations. First, many
observers point to the abolition of cumulative voting after a
1980 referendum. Under the old system, unique to Illinois,
every House district elected three representatives in
accordance with a voting rule that guaranteed that a
politician of the weaker party would be elected in almost
every district This brought into the chamber Republicans
from Chicago and Democrats from GOP-leaning suburban
and downstate districts. As a result, party caucuses were
internally diverse. But the famous "cutback amendment" to
the state's constitution, approved by voters primarily to
reduce the size of the House and punish lawmakers who
had voted themselves a pay raise, had the additional effect
of establishing single-member districts, eliminating most
Chicago Republicans and many suburban Democrats. As
the two party caucuses became more unified in their
preferences, goes the argument, they became more willing
to delegate power to legislative party leaders, as happened
in the US Congress in the 1980s.
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But greater party unity can explain only a part of the new
centralization. For one thing, the elimination of
cumulative voting affected only the House. For another,
the level of party unity in roll call voting has risen only
moderately. State politics scholar Hugh LeBlanc
calculated indices of party cohesion in Illinois Senate roll
calls in 1960; while these indices have not been computed
since, bis study implies that the average Illinois state
senator voted with his party about 84% of the time when a
majority of one party voted against a majority of the other.
In 1995-96, the average senator voted with a majority of
his or her party 90% of the time, according to the Almanac
ofIllinois Politics.
The insiders' second explanation is that changes in
campaign finance have strengthened legislative leaders.
Since 1980 the cost of state legislative campaigns has
escalated, increasing candidates' need for help in raising
money. The first person to answer this need on a large
scale was Michael Madigan, then as now the House
Democratic leader and seeking to become Speaker. As
political scientist Kent Redfield puts it, "The phenomenon
of legislative leaders increasing their power by fundraising
really got started with Madigan in the early eighties, after
the abolition of cumulative voting, and was copied by the
other leaders. The role of leadership campaign committees
grew in the 1980s and really took off in the early 1990s,
going up in every recent cycle." Figure 1 illustrates the
explosion in leadership-committee campaign money,
which grew to $1 1.7 million in last year's general election,
along with another $1.0 million spent in primary races. In
addition to money, leaders have been supplying candidates
with personnel and expertise.
Leadership campaign committees have grown in
importance in a number of states in the last fifteen years.
But they have become overwhelmingly important in
Illinois. Indeed, the 1996 elections represented another
abrupt leap in their importance: though leadership
committees had never raised more than one-quarter of all
campaign money available to Assembly candidates in the
past, last year they provided 51% of all general-election
spending. And there's more: leaders gave some
candidates additional money directly out of their personal
PACs, the ones with sociable names like "Friends of
Michael J. Madigan" and "Friends of Lee Daniels."
The relationship between leaders' money and leaders'
power is that of chicken and egg. Control of campaign
money gives leaders more power in the legislature. Power
in the legislature enables leaders to get control of campaign
money, by inducing interest groups to contribute to
leadership committees rather than to individual candidates.
There is no way to say which is the cause and which the
effect But the cycle, as Figure 1 shows, has been
continuing through the early 1990s.
Figure 1: Spending by Leadership Campaign Committees
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Legislators don't agree on what kind of power control of
campaign money gives leaders. Some say that campaign
money buys only two things: a member's vote in
leadership contests and a sympathetic hearing for the
leader's arguments. Others say that members who have
received a great deal of money find it hard to vote against
the leaders on issues the leaders consider important. While
some members are dissatisfied with this state of affairs,
many are not.
The third explanation is current among scholars rather
than practitioners. According to political scientist Jack
Van der Slik. the potential for power has always been in
the leadership posts. What has changed is only the
aggressiveness and effectiveness with which leaders use
that power. Illinois stands out, according to Van der Slik,
because of the long tenure of its leaders. A quartet of
politicians—Madigan, Philip Rock, Lee Daniels and Pate
Philip—held the full set of leadership posts between 1983
and 1992; and the only change since 1992 has been the
replacement of Rock by Emil Jones. Philip, the Senate
Republican leader since 1981, is one of the longest-
standing legislative leaders in the country. Long periods in
office have enabled leaders to build their relationships with
members and interest groups, and to ride the chicken-and-
egg cycle between campaign money and power a long way.
In this story, the General Assembly would drop back to
levels of centralization typical of other states (or lower) if
the current Four Tops were all to retire in a short period.
The fourth explanation is offered mostly by lobbyists. As
the salaries of legislators have grown, a number of
legislators have become dependent on them. They toe the
leader's line because they can't afford to risk their jobs in
the name of principled independence. Some legislators,
however, reply that politicians never like to lose office,
whatever the salary.
Very likely, the primary causes of centralization in Illinois
have been the same as elsewhere: the rise in campaign
costs, decline of party machines, and consequent rise in
the need of candidates for leaders' help, along with rising
party homogeneity. But the trend to centralization has
been exacerbated here by idiosyncratic factors that allowed
the chicken-and-egg cycle to run unusually fast and long:
the high degree of political savvy and drive Madigan
brought out of the old world of Chicago patronage politics,
and the long tenure of legislative leaders. The abolition of
cumulative voting may have removed a barrier to this
process in the House, but only to the extent of making it
typical of state legislative chambers around the country.
Divided Government. Divided government is not a recent
phenomenon: Illinois moved from typically unified party
control to typically divided party control between the
1930s and the 1970s. Nor is it confined to this state.
However, Illinois is unusual in its consistency: for twenty
years it has been electing Republican governors and
(almost always) Democrat-controlled assemblies. The
underlying causes of divided government are probably the
same in Illinois as elsewhere, the switch to ballots that
facilitate ticket-splitting, the decline in party attachments,
and the professionalization of state legislatures. In
Illinois, though, there seems to be an additional factor:
the tendency of the GOP (at least since 1968) to nominate
gubernatorial candidates who are much more moderate
than its candidates for other offices. The recent budget
battle, in which Governor Edgar advocated raising income
taxes to provide money for poorer school districts against
overwhelming opposition from Republican legislators,
illustrates the difference. As moderates, Republican
gubernatorial nominees run ahead of Republican
legislative candidates.
Governor-Leader Negotiations. Once power in the
Assembly was centralized, it was likely that policy would
be set in negotiations among legislative leaders and
between leaders and the governor. Many observers believe
that this pattern was established in the early 1980s, when
Governor Thompson and the then leaders simplified the
budget process, partly in order to deal with the perennial
difficulty of passing tax increases. The old Illinois budget
consisted of a series of appropriations bills voted on
separately. The new budget is a single package; members
can't propose amendments to the final conference report
and must, in effect, take it or leave it. "There evolved a
situation," says Wheeler, "in which the budget is decided
by negotiation between the governor and legislative
leaders much more than in the past." While this is less
true in other areas of policymaking, the centralized
bargaining pattern is now well-established.
Consequences of Centralized Bargaining
Should we be unhappy about the new pattern of power?
Critics both here and nationally suggest that centralized
bargaining may lead to five problems: increased deficit
spending; deadlock, meaning the inability to pass major
bills; lack of communication between executive and
legislature and consequent failures of implementation;
greater interest-group power; and lack of democracy within
the legislature.
Deficit Spending. Political scientists don't agree about the
effects of centralized but party-divided government on
budgeting. Divided government may cause higher deficits.
For example, when a unified set of Democrats who control
one branch or chamber want more spending for urban
programs and less for programs that benefit middle-class
suburbanites, while a unified set of Republicans who
control another branch or chamber want more spending on
suburban programs and less on urban ones, the easiest way
for them to reach agreement is to spend more on both types
of programs. Unable to raise taxes to the same extent, they
end up borrowing money. Furthermore, no one is clearly
responsible for budget balance. The effect of centralization
in itself is likely to be the opposite: with a small number of
people making budget decisions behind closed doors, it's
easier for them to agree on the politically difficult steps
necessary to keep budgets in balance. Which of these has
happened in Illinois?
To be sure, borrowing has risen in Illinois since 1980,
implying a failure of fiscal responsibility. But borrowing
has risen in many states, regardless of institutional
changes, over the same period. Unfortunately, with so
many other things affecting the development of budgets,
we can only speculate about whether Illinois is borrowing
less or more because of the shift to a centralized budget
process. It seems intuitively likely that the gains from
coordination since the Thompson era cancel out the losses
from divided party control.
Deadlock. There are also two theories about the overall
effect of divided government and centralized party control
of a legislature on the ability to make policy. According to
the "gridlock" theory, propounded by Ross Perot and his
followers, it means little gets done: a unified legislature of
party A digs in its heels, as does a unified executive of
party B. According to the "veto gates" theory, more
familiar among political scientists, the fewer people who
have a veto over policy, the easier it is to make coherent
policy and in particular to make difficult decisions. Has
the combination of legislative centralization and divided
government in Illinois made it easier or harder to reach
decisions?
A study of Illinois Issues' coverage of major bills proposed
and voted on since 197S suggests that centralization hasn't
made much difference. Figure 2 reports two shaggy
measures of the ability of Illinois politicians to put changes
into law. The first is a count of bills that were classified by
Illinois Issues authors early in a legislative session as
addressing important issues, and that were ultimately
passed in that session. The second is the rate at which
proposed bills making major changes (as identified by
Illinois Issues early in a session) became law, weighted to
take into account cases where bills passed only after being
seriously watered down. Neither measure shows any clear
trend over time. Nor do the two brief periods of unified
government (the first and last two years shown) look
different from the others. On the whole, Illinois Issues'
coverage doesn't suggest there has been much change in
capacity to govern. Nor has there been any consistent
change in the rate at which governors veto bills. This
accords with the findings of scholars who have studied the
effects of similar trends towards centralization and divided
government at the federal level.
Figure 2: Passage of Legislation Considered Important by "Illinois Issues"
- Number of major bills passed
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If the new pattern doesn't produce deadlock, why do some
people think it does? The main reason seems to be that
centralized bargaining has run less smoothly and less
effectively in the 1990s than in the 1980s. But
centralization and divided government were largely in
place in the middle and late eighties. What happened? A
variety of informed persons ascribe the change to the
difference in political styles between Governor Thompson
( 1 977-90) and Governor Edgar ( 1 99 1 - ). Thompson got
along well with Democrats like Madigan and Rock; Edgar
hasn't communicated to the same extent even with
Republican leaders. Thompson enjoyed and accepted the
negotiation process and was prepared to put almost
anything on the table; Edgar, a detail man, prefers to put
together a policy he thinks is right and present it to leaders
of both parties on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Both styles
have their strengths and weaknesses. In any case, the
current seeming deadlock across branches seems to be a
consequence of Edgar's approach to governing rather than
of the new pattern of policymaking. It was not notably
different when Republicans controlled both houses in
1995-96, and might change overnight if the next governor
is a dealmaker in the Thompson mold. However, the
current situation does suggest that centralization by itself is
not giving Illinois stronger and more effective government
Lack ofCommunication. Some legislators complain that
the executive branch doesn't communicate well with the
General Assembly. They say that it's hard to write good
laws when you're not talking to the people who will
implement them. This might arise from legislative
centralization and divided government, but the story here
seems to be the same as with apparent deadlock. A large
number of observers agree that to the extent that the
current era is unusual, it's a consequence ofJim Edgar's
political style. Unlike his predecessor, Edgar likes to keep
his executive branch as free as possible of legislative
influences. Again, the new pattern of policymaking itself
is not to blame.
Interest Group Power. Some observers believe that the
centralization of power in the Illinois legislature has
strengthened interest groups in two ways. First, through
the sheer importance of interest-group money itself, which
makes backbenchers dependent on leaders while leaders
are beholden to groups. However, if the direct power of
money has increased, it's because of the rising cost of
campaigns rather than centralization ofpower per se.
Second, leaders' tight grip on staff limits the information
available to backbenchers, which forces many of them to
look to interest groups for information or cues about policy.
However, some legislators say that alternate sources of
information are available for those members who care to
use them. While this possibility can't be ruled out, we
probably shouldn't conclude that the new pattern of
policymaking has made interest groups more powerful.
The power of interest groups impresses itself as a problem
in all places and times in the United States, and it's easy
for people familiar only with their own state and era to
imagine that these groups are unusually powerful.
Furthermore, political scientists generally find that, if
anything, interest groups are most powerful where political
authority is least centralized.
Lack ofDemocracy. Americans picture a democratic
legislature as one in which power is fairly evenly divided
among independent legislators. In that sense, the Illinois
legislature looks less democratic than many other state
legislatures. Committees are to a great extent under
leadership control. Members have no staff and relatively
few sources of information outside the leaders. Leaders are
said to have appointed many staffers for their political
rather than their policy skills, increasing their power while
exacerbating the backbenchers' lack of information. The
fate of a member's favorite bill may depend solely on
getting support from the leader.
If Illinoisans share the general American suspicion of
concentrated power, they have reason to be unhappy with
the current state of the General Assembly. The
centralized bargaining pattern annoys many legislators,
especially House Democrats. But there are several
reasons not to jump to the conclusion that the new pattern
is a form of tyranny. First, citizens of other democracies
accept party discipline and leadership control in
legislatures as a matter of course. Members of the British
House of Commons troop onto the floor to vote the party
line without complaint often without knowing what they
are voting on. Even Canadians, so similar to Americans,
accept control of legislation by party leaders as a natural
part of the democratic process.
Second, the General Assembly is at base built on majority
rule; though leaders may have become more powerful than
many of us would like, we should remember that they are
far from being dictators. The leadership campaign
committees give leaders a great deal of maneuvering room
and personal power, but their power rests at the same time
on their ability to provide services that members want.
Thus Mike Madigan, representative of fairly conservative
Bungalow Belters, acts as facilitator for an essentially
liberal coalition. Part of the problem may be that many
members don't really seek more independence than they
have: "Members have only themselves to blame for
choosing the easier course of relying primarily on
leadership money for campaigns rather than developing
their own independent bases of financial support," says
Representative Jeffrey Schoenberg.
Nevertheless, the one undeniable concern about
centralized bargaining is the loss of power by individual
legislators, especially since it's not clear that Illinois has
received more effective government in exchange. If
people see the new pattern of power as undemocratic, how
might it be reversed?
What Can We Do About It?
1. Reform campaignfinance: As Redfield points out in
Cash Clout, Illinois has essentially a campaign-finance
disclosure law rather than real limits on giving and
spending. Proposed limits on campaign money are a
familiar refrain among reformers, but the public has never
become angry enough to make them a reality. Apart from
their direct effect on interest-group power, such limits
would probably tend to decentralize power in the
Assembly.
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2. Revive cumulative voting: In the Illinois Issues for June
1995, Charlie Wheeler proposed reviving the system of
three-member House districts as a cure for sectionalism.
By making party contingents more diverse, it might also
reduce legislative centralization, and it might conceivably
make it harder for leaders to target campaign spending,
thus reducing the role of leadership campaign committees.
But these benefits are matters of conjecture.
3. Increase staffing and informationfor backbenchers:
Though this is unlikely to happen in the immediate future,
establishing personal staffs for members, reducing the
politicization of committee staff and beefing up the policy
analysis available to backbenchers might give members
greater independence from leaders and interest groups.
This kind of reassertion by individual members isn't
unheard-of; twice in the twentieth century (in 1910 and in
the 1970s) backbench members of Congress succeeded in
reasserting their powers against party leaders and
committee chairmen. The most likely scenario in Illinois
today is for individual members to insist that new leaders
grant them more decentralized control of staff when the
Four Tops retire.
If none of these reforms prove obtainable, we can comfort
ourselves by remembering that there is nothing inherently
undemocratic about centralized power—as long as that
power is responsive to the public through elections.
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Legislative Issues in
Physician-Assisted Suicide
by Russell B. Korobkin
In long-anticipated decisions, the United States Supreme
Court concluded its last term by finding constitutional New
York and Washington state laws that criminalize the act of
physician-assisted suicide ("PAS") The Court's unanimous
rulings in Vacco v. Quill and Washington v. Glucksberg did
not pass judgment on the ethics or desirability of PAS, but
merely expressed a consensus among a jurisprudentially
conservative set ofjustices that the United States
Constitution has nothing to say about the issue one way or
another. The right to die, so says the High Court, is a
matter for the people and their legislatures, not courts, to
debate and resolve.
In November 1997 citizens of Oregon voted to retain that
state's "Death with Dignity Act," initially approved in 1994.
Oregon is the only state to have legalized PAS. It is a fair
prediction, though, that Oregon will not stand alone for
long. In the wake of the Supreme Court's recent decision,
legislation seeking to legalize PAS is likely to be proposed
and seriously considered during the coming years in
virtually every state. This article briefly reviews the issues
that legislation proposing to legalize PAS must confront,
and describes how proposals recently introduced — but not
enacted, save for in Oregon — in state legislatures around
the country propose to resolve these issues.
PAS vs. Euthanasia
The most fundamental issue that "right to die" legislation
must confront is whether it will be limited to PAS, in which
the physician prescribes a lethal dose of medication but the
patient must self-administer the dose, or extend to active
voluntary euthanasia, in which the physician may
administer the lethal dose to the patient who requests death,
most likely in the form of a lethal injection. The more
limited right to PAS was sought by the plaintiffs in
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Glucksberg and Quill. Active euthanasia is officially
condoned (although technically illegal) in the Netherlands.
The arguments for limiting legislation to PAS tend to be
pragmatic in nature. Legalizing voluntary euthanasia (rather
than just PAS) would substantially increase the risk that
individuals who do not want to die (or, at least, do not
express a preference for dying) would be put to death by
mistake. The argument for permitting voluntary euthanasia
in addition to PAS rests largely on the theoretical principle
of horizontal equity ~ that individuals in "like" circum-
stances should be treated alike by the law. PAS, by its
nature, is restricted to those who are not so ill or
incapacitated that they are unable to self-administer the
lethal medication.
To date, the pragmatic arguments have prevailed over the
theoretical. All recent legislative proposals, save one,
explicitly state that they do not condone or authorize lethal
injection, mercy killing, or active euthanasia. Oregon's
Death with Dignity Act as originally drafted would have
permitted active voluntary euthanasia, but this provision was
dropped by supporters of the initiative, apparently out of fear
that it would jeopardize the initiative's chance of passage.
Patients and PAS
Health Status. IfPAS is legalized, who should be eligible?
In Glucksberg and Quill the plaintiffs seeking to overturn
the Washington and New York laws prohibiting PAS
alleged that they were "terminally ill"; that is, that they were
told by their doctors that they had only a short time to live.
But there is nothing inherent in the concept ofPAS that
requires the practice to be limited to the terminally ill. In
theory, PAS could be made available to all individuals who
decide they would prefer death to life, or it could be
Visit the IGPA web page at: http://www.igpa.uillinois.edu
circumscribed in some way but offered to a broader class of
individuals than the terminally ill. Limiting a right to PAS
to terminally ill patients, at a minimum, raises questions of
fairness for chronically — but not terminally — ill patients,
especially those experiencing a good deal of suffering as a
result of their illnesses.
To date, however, most proposals would limit eligbility for
PAS to patients suffering from illnesses diagnosed as
terminal. Most of the proposals define a terminal illness as
one that physicians believe will lead to death within six
months, although some proposals include more flexible
definitions ofwhat constitutes a terminal condition.
Mental Competence. Even ardent supporters ofPAS agree
that the option should not be available to people who are not
mentally competent to choose it. But how should the law,
substantively and procedurally, attempt to guarantee
competence? Most of the recently introduced bills would
restrict PAS to patients not suffering from a mental disorder
or depression that "impairs" or "distorts" the patient's
judgment, although none of the bills attempts to define these
terms. Leaving determinations of whether a patient suffers
from impaired judgment to mental health professionals is
unlikely to result in a coherent or consistent application of
PAS legislation. Except in extreme cases, even such
professionals have difficulty determining whether the
judgment of seriously medically ill patients is impaired.
Legislation also must resolve the question ofwho
determines whether or not a patient requesting PAS meets
the mental competence standard. A minority of the current
PAS proposals would require a patient seeking PAS to
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consult with a mental health professional in order to insure
that the patient can pass the "impaired judgment" standard.
Most of the existing proposals would assign to the patient's
treating physician the responsibility of determining whether
a mental health consultation is necessary.
Residency Requirements. When Oregon voters enacted that
state's Death With Dignity Act, Oregon became the only
state to legalize PAS. It was perhaps not surprising, given
this fact, that the Act limited eligibility for the procedure to
residents of the state - presumably to assuage fears that
Oregon would be flooded with terminally ill patients from
other states who wanted to take advantage ofPAS but cculd
not do so at home. The bills introduced since the enactment
of the Oregon initiative have split evenly on the question of
whether residency should be required for program
eligibility.
Legislators must consider not only the efficacy of residency
requirements, but also their legality. Such provisions are
almost certain to be challenged as unconstitutional. The
U.S. Constitution's privileges and immunities clause
requires that "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several
States." In other words, each state must provide the same
rights to non-residents that it provides to its residents, so
long as the right is a significant one. In Doe vs. Bolton the
U.S. Supreme Court invalidated as a violation of the
privileges and immunities clause a Georgia requirement that
abortions could be performed legally only if the woman
seeking the procedure was a resident of the state. Although
the right to abortion is constitutionally protected while the
right to PAS is not, courts are likely to extend the Bolton
precedent to the context ofPAS.
Physicians and PAS
The Prescribing Physician. Legislation could reasonably
limit the class of physicians permitted to provide PAS.
Under one theory, PAS is best provided by a physician with
a longstanding professional relationship with the patient,
ensuring that the physician knows the "whole" patient, not
merely the manifestation of a disease process. Under a very
different theory, PAS is best provided by physicians skilled
in pain management. To date, however, none of the state
proposals has sought to limit in any meaningful way the
class of physicians who may respond to a request for PAS.
A proposed PAS initiative in Michigan, which supporters
are currently attempting to qualify for the state ballot, would
ensure that physicians who participate in PAS have at least
minimal knowledge of modern advances in palliative care.
The draft initiative provides that physicians who participate
in PAS must complete continuing medical education courses
in such areas as comfort care, pain control, removal of
nutrition and hydration, and psychiatric counseling.
Qualifications ofthe Consulting Physician. Most of the
current proposals would require at least one "second
opinion" to confirm that the patient's condition satisfies the
statutory definition of "terminal." The majority of bills
provide no firm restrictions on the qualifications of
"consulting physicians" other than that they (like the
treating physicians) be licensed to practice medicine in the
state. Consistent with the obvious purpose of requiring a
second opinion, most proposals would require that the
consulting physician possess "expertise" or experience in
treating the disease that has caused the patient to become
terminal and be capable of making a professional diagnosis,
but, to date, none of the proposals has specifically defined
these terms.
Physician Presence at Time ofDeath. Dedication to the
value of patient care and comfort suggests that the physician
who prescribes the lethal dose of medication be permitted to
be present when the patient takes her own life. On the other
hand, permitting physicians to be present at the time of
death risks subtle (and perhaps not so subtle) coercion of
patients who have an eleventh-hour inclination to reconsider
hastening their deaths. Furthermore, physician attendance
at the patient's bedside at the time the patient's life is taken
could easily blur the line between PAS and voluntary
euthanasia. Despite the desire of most of the state bills to
prohibit voluntary euthanasia, none of the proposals that
explicitly address this issue would preclude the attending
physician from witnessing a patient's death. Most proposals
would permit the physician to be present at the time of
death, and at least one would mandate the physician's
presence at that time.
Physicians Who Wish Not to Participate. Must physicians
fulfill requests for PAS? Consistent with the principle of
individual autonomy that underlies the argument in favor of
PAS, none of the current proposals would require that a
physician who receives a request for PAS provide the patient
with the means of death. A more difficult question is
whether a physician who receives a request for PAS and
declines to fulfill the request should have an affirmative
duty to refer the patient to a physician who is willing. The
majority of proposals to date would not impose such a duty
on conscientious objectors, although this position is not
unanimous.
A further question is whether hospitals or other health care
organizations can prohibit physicians who use their facilities
from providing PAS in those facilities. Most of the
legislative proposals to date grant without comment or
explanation the same freedom of conscience to health care
facilities as they grant to individual providers, but none
seem to have adequately dealt with the arguments against
facility freedom that are not applicable to provider freedom.
For example, it bears consideration that it would often be
more difficult for a patient whose request for PAS is denied
by an institution to change institutions than it would be for a
patient whose request is denied by a physician to change
physicians.
The Request for PAS
PAS legislation offers individuals the choice of ending their
lives in certain situations, thus promoting individual
autonomy; its greatest challenge is protecting the autonomy
of those who do not wish to take advantage of this option.
Protection of patientsfrom PAS can come in three forms:
(1) protection from a mistake or administrative error that
results in PAS being administered by accident; (2)
protection from the coercive or undue influence of third
parties who have their own interests rather than the
patient's interests at heart; and (3) protection from the
patient herself, who might opt for PAS out of a lack of
information or to satisfy a fleeting desire even when doing
so comes at the expense of a contrary, more stable,
preference for continued life. Request procedures, waiting
periods, informed consent provisions, and witness
requirements each can offer one or more of these types of
protections.
Request Procedures. The procedures for requesting PAS
must strike a balance between providing patients access to
and protecting them from PAS. Limiting right-to-die
legislation to PAS, in which the patient must self-administer
the lethal dosage of medication, rather than permitting
active voluntary euthanasia, reduces the likelihood that
either type of harm will result in a fatality, but this
precaution is not foolproof: an elderly or ill patient is likely
to take the medication that his doctor prescribes without
questioning the prescription.
All of the existing legislative proposals provide that at least
one request for PAS made by a patient to her attending
physician must be recorded in some way. Most of the bills
require that a request be made in writing, but some would
provide the patient with the option of recording her request
on video tape. Most of the proposals provide an additional
safeguard against mistaken administration ofPAS by
requiring the patient to request PAS on at least two separate
occasions, although all of these permit one of the requests to
be oral.
Waiting Periods. Requiring that requests for PAS be made
in writing or on video tape reduces the likelihood of
administrative error leading to an unwanted administration
ofPAS, but this safeguard does not protect patients from
hastily electing PAS when their preference for death might
be transitory rather than stable. Most proposals would
require a waiting period before a request for PAS could be
granted, presumably to ensure that the patient's choice is
stable. The majority would establish a two-week waiting
period, although some would allow a shorter waiting period.
Informed Consent. In an effort to ensure that patient
requests for PAS are not only stable but also well-informed,
most of the proposals spell out in detail what information
must be communicated by the attending physician to the
patient before the patient's PAS request may be honored. In
addition to requiring that the physician review with the
patient her diagnosis, prognosis, and other available medical
options, most of the proposals would require the physician
to review with the patient options for palliative care
including hospice and/or pain control possibilities.
Witness Requirements. All of the current proposals would
require that a patient's written or taped request for PAS be
witnessed. Most agree that a minimum of two witnesses
must observe this request. To avoid witness conflicts of
interest, most of the proposals require that at least one
witness (and in most cases both witnesses) not be entitled to
any portion of the patient's estate, not be employed by the
hospital or other health care provider, not be related to the
patient, and not be the patient's physician.
Precisely what role is the witness expected to serve? Most of
the proposals presume that a witness will attest that the
patient actually made the request for PAS. Some also would
require the witness to certify that the patient's election was
voluntary and did not result from coercion or undue
influence, although none of the proposals defines these
terms.
Russell Korobkin is an assistantprofessor in IGPA and at
the University ofIllinois College ofLaw.
[Editor's note: A more detailed analysis of this topic by
Professor Korobkin, "Physician-Assisted Death Legislation:
Issues and Preliminary Responses," is published as IGPA
Working Paper #60; copies may be obtained free-of-charge
from IGPA In addition, in February 1998 the institute
produced a half-hour audio tape exploring the legal and
policy implications of PAS, entitled, "Death With Dignity:
Whose Right Is It?" featuring Professors Korobkin and
Thomas S. Ulen. It is available from IGPA at a charge of
$ 10 per tape; checks should be made out to The University
of Illinois.]
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A New Generation of Environmental
Policy: Can It Control Toxic Pollution
Effectively?
Madhu Khanna
A clean environment is a collective good. Its benefits
exclude no one. Firms are therefore reluctant to bear the
costs of controlling their pollution. Government has
traditionally played an important role in shaping corporate
environmental decisions by mandating technologies that
abate pollution at the end-of-the-pipe.
The US now has 16 major national environmental laws,
which regulate pollutants by the media they contaminate: air,
land or water. The mandatory regulations affecting toxic
pollution include the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA) and the National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) created under the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1 990. While RCRA regulates
hazardous waste streams destined for disposal on land,
NESHAP regulates emissions of hazardous toxic chemicals
into the air. These air pollutants will be subject to the first
major Maximum Available Control Technology standards
by the year 2000. Firms can also be held liable for
environmental contamination under the Superfund Act and
required to undertake remedial measures and pay for
damages.
Pollution control costs are estimated to have gone up from
just $10 billion in 1974 to about $125 billion in 1992. The
media-specific focus of mandatory regulations can create
incentives for firms to shift pollution from one medium to
another. Moreover, by requiring pollution control at the
end-of-the-pipe, the regulations do not encourage firms to
reduce the generation of pollution at source through more
efficient use ofraw materials. Environmental policy makers
are gradually recognizing the steep costs and diminishing
effectiveness of their prescriptive and inflexible policies.
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This realization is leading to a major shift in the
environmental policy paradigm and to an array ofnew
measures to protect the environment.
A New Environmental Paradigm
The new approach has three major objectives:
1
.
Reduce pollution at source instead of cleaning up
pollution after it is generated.
2. Encourage firms to voluntarily plan and implement
approaches to pollution prevention.
3 Increase sharing of environmental information among
firms, government and the public.
To achieve these objectives, the EPA has initiated several
measures including increasing public access to
environmental databanks (such as the Toxics Release
Inventory), establishing voluntary programs (such as Green
Lights, the 33/50 Program, and Waste-Wise), promoting a
multi-media approach to pollution regulation, and
encouraging self-audits by firms. These initiatives represent
innovative efforts at engaging private sector participation in
protecting the environment and reducing the role ofbig
government bureaucracy in environmental management.
EPA's new approach to environmental protection is
accompanied by increased public concern for environmental
quality. Investors, consumers, and the media are paying
more and more attention to environmental compliance
records of companies. Environmental performance is
becoming a common component of corporate annual
Visit the IGPA web page at: http://www.igpa.uiilinois.edu
reports. Several surveys show that a majority of American
consumers are concerned about the environmental impact of
the products they purchase and are willing to pay more for
environmentally friendly products.
Corporate Response
Numerous corporations have responded to the new policies
and to changing public attitudes. They are turning away
from an adversarial approach that views environmental costs
as "non-productive" and are increasingly undertaking
measures to reduce pollution. They are also integrating
environmental considerations in their production strategies
by improving environmental product qualities, setting
numeric goals for reducing waste and increasing production
efficiency to prevent pollution. In sum, the situation appears
to be changing from government "push" to "business-led."
The EPA has reported that a large number offirms are
participating in voluntary pollution prevention programs. By
the end of 1993, 14 percent of the firms emitting the 17
toxic chemicals targeted by the 33/50 Program had
committed themselves to the program. By 1 994, 369 firms
had joined Waste-Wise and pledged to recycle and reuse
solid-waste, and 1612 firms had joined Green Lights.
Toxic wastes—onsite releases and off-site transfers-
generated by all manufacturing firms reporting to the Toxics
Release Inventory declined by 22 percent between 1 988 and
1990. Off-site transfers ofwaste for recycling and energy
recovery have, however, been increasing since 1 99 1 , when
firms were required to report these for the first time to the
TRI. As a result, the total waste generated increased by 6
percent over the period 1 99 1 -93
.
Anna J. Merritt, Managing Editor
IGPA University of Illinois
1007 West Nevada Street
Urbana, IL 61801
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A survey of firms by the Pollution Prevention Review in
1 994 shows that 74 percent of the surveyed firms conducted
waste audits, while 68 percent used facility-wide planning to
ensure that reductions in one area did not lead to waste in
another. Forty seven percent had specific numeric goals for
prevention of toxic pollution, and a large percent of them
imposed pollution prevention standards on their input
suppliers. Another survey by the EPA in 1 996 found that 85
percent of large manufacturers undertook pollution
prevention activities.
Two New Environmental Initiatives
Two initiatives in particular have motivated firms in the US
chemical industry to undertake proactive measures for
controlling their toxic wastes:
Public Provision of Toik Release Information The
Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know
Act of 1 986 requires all manufacturing facilities to
submit a report of their annual on-site releases and off-
site transfers of each of over 300 specified toxic
chemicals. These are compiled to form the TRI. These
data were first collected in 1 987 and are made available
to the public annually with a lag of two years.
The 33/50 Voluntary Program for Pollution
Control: This program, launched in 1 99 1 , aimed to
reduce the aggregate releases of 17 high priority toxic
chemicals to air, water and land by 33 percent by 1992
and by 50 percent by 1 995 relative to the level in 1 988.
These goals were not media-specific, and a firm had
flexibility in the amount ofreduction undertaken and the
means used to achieve it. The EPA, however,
encouraged firms to reduce pollution at source and
provided technical assistance and public recognition to
firms participating in the program.
The chemical industry is the largest contributor to toxic
releases generated by manufacturing industries and
accounted for 53 percent of the total toxic releases in 1987.
The findings reported here are based on two studies of
public firms in the chemical industry in the period 1 987-93.
The first study analyzes the impact ofpublic provision of
TRI on toxic wastes generated by firms. Toxic wastes
include both on-site releases and off-site transfers for
recycling, energy recovery and disposal. The second study
focuses on a sample of public firms in the chemical industry
that generate the 1 7 toxic chemicals targeted by the 33/50
Program. The firms targeted both on-site releases and off-
site transfers for treatment and disposal but excluded off-site
transfers for recycling and energy recovery. Sixty percent of
the firms included in this study participated in the 33/50
Program.
Motivations for Corporate Response
Both the public provision ofTRI and the 33/50 Program
have created a number of incentives for firms to become
environmental stewards.
Direct Incentives Provided by the Market. Availability of
environmental information about firms allows consumers
and stockholders to signal their concern for the environment
through changes in demand for products of a company and
changes in its stock prices.
My research shows that provision of environmental
information led investors to penalize firms whose pollution
levels were higher than previously anticipated. On average,
sample firms incurred negative stock market returns of 0.2-
0.4 percent in the one-day period following the release of
TRI data. These negative returns translated into millions of
dollars in losses for these firms. Furthermore, consumer
pressure and desire for public recognition were strong
motivators for participation in the 33/50 Program. Firms
selling consumer goods are in closer contact with the public
and were therefore more likely to participate than firms
selling intermediate goods. Firms whose costs of abatement
were likely to be smaller than the losses due to adverse
investor and consumer reactions were likely to undertake
self-regulated environmental management to avoid such
losses in the future.
Incentives Provided by Voluntary Environmental
Programs. By allowing flexibility in the methods of
pollution control and in choice of pollutants to be abated
(irrespective ofmedia), the 33/50 Program allowed firms to
choose least-cost methods of pollution control. By reducing
their pollution ahead of time, firms could also save on the
costs of complying with technology-based regulations in the
future and prevent liabilities for environmental damages.
Voluntary reduction in pollution could therefore provide
participating firms a strategic advantage over their
competitors.
The 33/50 Program provided certain direct benefits to
participating firms such as public recognition through press
releases, newsletters, and awards. It also provided technical
assistance on pollution prevention methods, through
nationally held workshops, computer bulletin boards, and
resource guides. These features of the program played an
important role in motivating participation because they
improved consumer goodwill and lowered the costs of
learning about waste-reducing practices for participants.
StringentMandatory Regulations. My research shows that
the threat of future liabilities under the Superfund Act and
anticipation ofNESHAP strongly motivated sample firms to
participate in the voluntary 33/50 Program. Firms
potentially responsible for a larger number of Superfund
sites and those currently emitting a large volume of
hazardous air pollutants were more likely to participate in
the 33/50 Program. Potential liabilities under the Superfund
Act also provided a strong deterrent to on-site toxic releases
and induced greater abatement of toxic wastes. The
regulations led many firms to undertake self-regulation of
toxic wastes using flexible, cost-effective methods. The two
surveys mentioned above show that a majority of the firms
rank regulatory compliance as a primary motivator for their
pollution prevention efforts.
Effectiveness of the New Generation of
Environmental Policy
Has this new approach to environmental protection been
effective in reducing the toxic pollution generated by firms?
The observed data show that the on-site releases of the
sample firms in this study declined continuously over the
period 1 988-93. They fell by 35 percent in 1 988-90 and by
27 percent in 1 99 1 -93 . Off-site transfers declined over the
period 1 988-90 but increased by 46 percent in 1 99 1 -93. As
a result, total toxic waste generation increased by 1 1 percent
in 1991-93.
The sample participants in the 33/50 Program reduced their
releases of targeted toxic chemicals by 41 percent in 1991
-
93. They achieved much higher reductions than non-
participants. During that period, participants reduced these
releases by an average of 1 .2 million pounds per firm, while
non-participants reduced them by an average of 0.08 million
pounds per firm.
My research examines the contribution of the two new
initiatives to these observed trends in toxic releases. It
controls for the effects of other factors, such as reduction in
production levels and compliance with mandatory
regulations, on toxic releases. The key findings of this
analysis are:
Negative investor reactions had a significant negative
impact on on-site releases. The larger the negative
stock market returns experienced by firms following the
public disclosure of TRI data, the greater the reduction
in the magnitude of their on-site releases.
These negative investor reactions also led firms to
increase off-site transfers of their toxic pollutants to
recycling and waste treatment facilities over the period
1991-93.
Negative investor reactions, however, had an
insignificant impact on the total toxic wastes generated
by firms over the period 1 99 1 -93 . These initiatives also
do not appear to have led to reduction in pollution at
source as measured by the ratio of toxic pollution
generated per unit of sales. Nevertheless, even a change
in the composition of toxic releases could have net
benefits for society. Since on-site releases go directly to
the environment, they are likely to be riskier for human
health than off-site transfers for recycling or treatment.
The 33/50 Program played a significant role in reducing
the total volume of the targeted chemicals generated by
firms in our sample. It contributed to a decline of about
28 percent in releases of their 33/50 Program chemicals
over the period 1991-93. However, even in this case,
program participation did not lead to a significant
decline in the waste-output ratio of the participant firms
relative to the non-participants. Hence, the effectiveness
of the program in promoting pollution prevention may
have been limited.
Conclusions
environmental performance. Although these initiatives have
not contributed significantly to the source reduction of
pollution, they have led to a change in the composition of
wastes. Firms have reduced their on-site releases and
increased off-site transfers for recycling, energy recovery
and treatment. This change is likely to lower the net risks
associated with toxic waste generation.
The initiatives are unlikely by themselves to generate the
desired changes in corporate behavior, unless backed by
stringent mandatory regulations. The latter must provide
credible penalties in the form of liabilities and compliance
costs levied on firms that do not undertake proactive
measures for self-regulation. By providing flexibility in the
method and amount of pollution controlled, these initiatives
can lower the costs of environmental protection imposed by
mandatory environmental regulations. New generation
policy initiatives should therefore be regarded as
complements to rather than substitutes for mandatory
environmental regulations.
These findings suggest that the new environmental
initiatives have been effective in motivating corporations to
undertake self-regulated efforts to improve their
Madhu Khanna is an assistant professor in the
Department ofAgricultural and Consumer Economics at
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"The Donation Booth" or "Keep
Candidates in the Dark"
by Ian Ayres and Jeremy Bulow
/ think it 's disingenuousfor anybody
in public life to say that it doesn 't help
you to be consideredfor [a trade
mission] ifyou help the person who
happens to win an election .... And it
is a good thing to do. That 's the way
the political system works.
So sayeth our president. With this mindset, it's not
surprising that Clinton was obsessed with learning the
identity of his campaign contributors. But contrary to
our president's views, giving donors preferential
treatment is not "a good thing to do." And it's not the
way the political system has to work.
Ifwe could stop candidates from learning the identity of
contributors, big donors would not be able to buy perks
or policy. Mandating anonymous donations would make
it harder for candidates to sell access or influence,
because they would never know whether a donor had
paid the price.
Imagine what a world with anonymous donations would
look like. No more selling nights in the Lincoln
bedroom. No more ambassadorships ... or trade
missions for successful fund raisers.
There is no good reason why politicians need to know
the identity of their donors. People can signal the
intensity of their preferences by marching on
Washington -- barefoot if need be. An individual's
power to influence government should not turn on
personal wealth. Small donors are already effectively
anonymous, because $100 isn't going to buy very much
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face time with the president. Mandating anonymity is
likely to level the influence playing field by making small
contributions count for relatively more.
In what has become a post-election ritual, politicians
wring their hands about the problem of campaign donors
buying unwarranted "access." Candidates claim that
they never change positions because of contributions.
But if candidates really want to stop themselves from
selling influence or access, they should forego finding
out the identity of their contributors.
The privacy of the voting booth is a core feature of our
democracy. This privacy makes it much more difficult
for candidates to buy votes because at the end of the day
they can never be sure who voted for them.
We should replicate the privacy of the voting booth by
creating a "donation booth"— a screen that forces donors
to funnel campaign contributions through blind trusts.
Like the voting booth, the donation booth would keep
candidates from learning the identity of their supporters.
Several states have already experimented with
prohibiting judicial candidates from learning who
donates to their (re-)election campaigns. The logic of
course is that judges don't need to know the identity of
their donors: judicial decisions should be based on the
merits not contributors' money. But it is difficult to
explain why this logic does not apply to the other two
branches of government as well. Our experience with
judicial elections shows that donor anonymity can be
enforced and can deter contributors who would
otherwise seek to influence judicial decision making.
Visit the IGPA web page at: http://www.igpa.uillinois.edu
PAC Bundling and Soft Money. Mandating
anonymous donations could also help mitigate two of
the biggest influence abuses: PAC bundling and soft
money. Even though political action committees
(PACs) are not supposed to give more than $5,000 to
an individual federal candidate, PACs can bundle
together individual $1,000 contributions and pass them
on en masse. PAC bundles are often 10 to 20 times
greater than the statutory limit.
Our proposal would radically reduce the amount of
bundling because candidates would not know the
identity of the PAC that had procured the bundle of
individual donations. Currently, the PACs make
damn sure that the candidates understand who is
responsible for the bundle — so that the candidates will
be beholden to the PACs. Under our proposal, PACs
could still solicit contributions for candidates, but they
could not buy access from the victors. Recent
regulations, however, have moved us in the wrong
direction. This may be a case in which less information
would be better than more. PACs must now publicly
disclose how much bundling is going on. But an
appreciation of voting booth privacy suggests that a
better regulation would prohibit PACs from reporting to
the general public or the candidate that they are
successfully fundraising.
Anna J. Merritt, Managing Editor
IGPA University of Illinois
1007 West Nevada Street
Urbana, IL 61801
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Channeling donations through blind trusts could mitigate
the "soft-money" loophole that allowed Clinton and Dole
to spend $250 million more than contemplated by
existing campaign finance regulation. Soft-money
contributions to political parties can be used for
television commercials that openly disparage the other
party's candidate as long as the commercials refrain
from using magic words such as Avote for X.@
Reformers have attempted to stop "soft money" by
expanding what counts as a campaign ad or allocating
part of soft-money expenditures to candidates' campaign
limits. But "no disclosure" is better than "full
disclosure." Ifwe simply kept President Clinton in the
dark about the identity of his soft money contributors, he
would have a much harder time extracting six-figure
gifts from James Riady and company. Instead of trying
to discern whether soft money is being used to promote a
particular candidate, the donation booth would reduce
the incentive for donors to write large soft-money checks
in the first place.
How Might A "Donation Booth" Work? One could
imagine a system of literal donation booths controlled by
the government: Once the curtain closed, people could
drop their cash donations into a slot for the candidate of
their choice and the government would periodically pass
these contributions onto the appropriate candidate. We
prefer a privatized system of blind trusts — operated by
established trust companies with substantial, preexisting
assets (of more than, say, $100 million). All candidates,
political parties and political action committees would
establish blind trust accounts at qualified institutions.
The core regulation would require all donations to
candidates, political parties and PACs to be made by
mail to the blind trusts representing the recipient.
Campaigns would no longer be allowed to accept money
in cash or check. Campaigns would still need check
books but not deposit slips. The blind trusts would keep
the identity of all contributions larger than $200
anonymous. Large donors would have the option of
having the trust disclose that they had given at least
$200, but under no circumstance would the trust identify
a donor as having contributed more than $200.
The blind trusts would then report to the candidates on a
weekly or a biweekly basis how much money had been
donated, but not detail the amounts given by large
donors. Representatives of the blind trust could not be
employed in positions influencing access or policy —
and as a prophylactic should be required not to
communicate privately with candidates or campaign
workers.
Candidates could still ask individuals for support, but
could not close the deal. This by itself might free
politicians from the current fund-raising marathon of
constantly seeking contributions. Under our regime of
mandated anonymity, dinner could not be priced above
cost. Instead, campaign workers could do no more than
distribute postage-free envelopes addressed to the blind
trust — so that attendees could later mail in a
contribution.
The trust's books would be publicly audited only some
number of years after the candidate left office. This ex
post auditing would allow donors to be sure that their
donations had in fact gone to their candidate and to
allow the public to assess whether donations were —
notwithstanding the trust — purchasing access or
influence.
Could Donors Avoid Anonymity? What's to stop a
donor from telling a candidate on the sly about a large
"soft money" contribution? Probably nothing. But talk
is cheap. Anyone can claim they voted for Clinton, but
the voting booth makes it impossible to prove that you
voted for him. The important question is whether
regulation could stop donors from credibly speaking
about their gifts.
Most generally, we recommend a system where non-
donors could easily mimic the signals of real donors.
For example, we recommend a 10-day cooling off
period in which contributors could cancel their
contribution. A cooling off period would give non-
donors as well as donors the ability to acquire canceled
checks from the trust. And allowing donors to privately
cancel their donations would also reduce the "mailbox"
problem of donors trying to mail their contribution in
the presence of a campaign worker.
Of course, candidates would still know a lot. Donating
your time to fundraising might still garner perks such
as ambassadorships. But the effect would be muted,
because — as with PAC bundling — the candidate
wouldn't be able to see how much money a particular
person raised.
More important, mandating anonymous donations would
undoubtedly lead some donors to purchase television ads
supporting a candidate. Our constitution does not permit
limiting individuals' ability to speak.. Direct speech
would therefore allow rich individuals to continue to
signal their willingness to spend money on behalf of
particular candidates. But the possibility of a "direct
speech" end run would not completely undermine the
effectiveness of mandated anonymity. Current law limits
the ability of corporations and labor unions to engage in
direct speech. Moreover, independent "direct speech"
ads are not as valuable to candidates (and therefore
wouldn't purchase as much influence) because
candidates cannot control their content. And requiring
direct speakers to identify themselves would further limit
their effectiveness: A million-dollar ad campaign paid
for by tobacco company executives is a lot less valuable
than one million dollars.
Undoubtedly candidates would find ways to identify
some donors. But even a leaky bucket might be better
than the current system. When you make something
more costly, you are likely to produce less of it. In the
end, we predict that mandating donor anonymity would
substantially reduce the number of 6-figure donations.
This drop itself would be evidence that many donors are
not donating merely to help their candidate win, but are
also hoping to purchase access and/or influence.
Is It Politically Feasible? Cynics will argue that any
reform worth doing has no chance of passing. And more
than likely the incumbent chairs of powerful
congressional committees would want to oppose our
proposal — because a large proportion of their "access"
money would dry up. But opponents would have
difficulty explaining why they need to know the identity
of their donors. An expanding group ofCEOs is
pledging not to give soft money to either political party.
These and other donors should support our proposal,
because mandated anonymity removes the political
pressure to give (or else).
At a minimum, we should change the law to give
individual candidates the option of using blind
trusts to finance their campaigns. The first question
candidates should be asked when they announce their
candidacy is whether they will commit to donor
anonymity.
Unlike many of the other reforms that have been
proposed, mandated anonymity is constitutional. Just
as there is no constitutional right to be able to prove
that you voted for a candidate, there is no constitutional
right to be able to prove that you gave the candidate
money. In either instance, you will be able to say that
you did — you just won't be able to prove it. The
current caps on individual and corporate donations at
best indirectly discourage political corruption by
limiting the maximum "price" of influence. We suggest
instead that it may be more effective to create
uncertainty about whether the price was ever paid.
A growing number of politicians is embracing full and
immediate disclosure as the only effective means to
discourage politicians from selling access or influence.
But the opposite strategy of keeping the candidate as
well as the public in the dark has a long pedigree. The
Jewish sage Maimonides long ago extolled the benefits
of anonymous charity. We should remind ourselves why
we choose to make voting a solitary act. The "donation
booth" might not be a panacea, but it would keep faith
with the simple and widely held beliefthat the amount of
your political donation should not determine your access
to government.
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